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I. Introduction 
I.1. Preface 
Due to prominent activist campaigns especially in the U.S. against Dell, Apple and Ebay and its equally 
prominent protagonists like Carl Icahn or Paul Singer, shareholder activism became a regular topic in 
national and international business outlets in recent years and therefore known to a broader public. A recent 
analysis of Bain & Company (2015) underpins this observation and emphasises that the worldwide number 
of activist approaches rose by an average of 34% per year since 2000. The relevance of shareholder activism 
is also shown in the study as 8% of the total capital invested in hedge funds worldwide, i.e. 3 trillion USD, 
is controlled already by shareholder activist funds.  
Since its origins in the 1980s, the academic world has always been fascinated by shareholder 
activism as research subject and its impact on corporates, its management and supervisory bodies, share 
prices as well as operating and financial performance of the activists’ target companies. Most research 
focuses on the U.S. corporate environment whereas the topic is still rarely researched in Continental Europe. 
Therefore, the main purpose of this dissertation is to fill this research gap and to provide an in-depth analysis 
of shareholder activism in Continental Europe in general and Germany in specific, its key players and the 
main characteristics of the Continental European and German corporate governance system and corporate 
environment compared to Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. 
The first study analyses the investment activities and returns of shareholder activist and hedge fund 
manager Guy Wyser-Pratte as well as his success and failure rate to enforce his demands against the 
management and supervisory bodies of the approached companies in Continental Europe between 2001 and 
2011. The second study is an in-depth clinical study of a specific single activist investment of Guy Wyser-
Pratte in Germany which shows in detail the confrontation between an activist shareholder, a typical German 
medium sized company and a German family business investor which is – compared to Anglo-Saxon 
jurisdictions – a common element of the investor universe in Continental Europe and especially in Germany. 
The third study compares the investment activities of Continental European family business investors with 
private equity funds to identify any similarities and differences in their investment approach in more detail 
for the first time and to clarify if family business investors should be taken into consideration as another key 
player in future research on shareholder activism in Continental Europe. 
The introductory part of this doctoral thesis proceeds as follows. The next subchapter gives an 
overview of shareholder activism, its origins and key players in the context of this dissertation. The 
subsequent section identifies the specifics of the Continental European and German corporate governance 
environment compared to the predominant system in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions like the U.S. and the U.K. 
The section continues with an overview of the existing literature on shareholder activism and its related 
topics, especially with focus on research from the U.S., Continental Europe and Germany. The three 
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subsequent sections include the theoretical framework, development of hypothesis and some explanatory 
remarks on the process of data collection and the corresponding test statistics. The introductory chapter ends 
with a brief presentation of the three research papers and their contribution to literature. 
 
I.2. Definition of Shareholder Activism, its Origins and Key Players 
Shareholder activism is today perceived as the effort of different investors, for example hedge funds, private 
equity firms, pension funds, mutual funds, or individual investors, to increase their return via actively 
influencing the target company’s management and supervisory board as well as its corporate governance 
structure (see for example Schwartzman and Snyder, 2007). Despite the comprehensive research on 
shareholder activism especially from the U.S., a single valid definition of shareholder activism is still 
missing. This is probably because of the broad spectrum of investors who execute an equally wide range of 
active investment strategies worldwide. Like for the missing definition the same holds for an encompassing 
global database which for example lists relevant information like activism events and information about the 
investor and target. Due to the lack of valid data and definition, the data in this dissertation is hand-collected 
for each specific analysis and the definition of shareholder activism used in this dissertation follows the 
understanding of shareholder activism mentioned above: shareholder activists are investors who are actively 
influencing the management and supervisory bodies of a listed company to increase their returns.  
This understanding of shareholder activism is mainly rooted in the social rights movements in the 
U.S. during the 1940s to 1960s ((Thompson and Davis, 1997), (Vogel, 1983)) where more and more 
shareholders, especially individual investors, became interested in the monitoring of social, economic and 
governance issues focusing on the companies they invested in. In the 1980s, other investor groups entered 
the stage as active investors like corporate raiders, pension funds, insurance companies, labour unions or 
strategic investors (Brav et al., 2008). These shareholder groups became active when they were for example 
dissatisfied with the performance of the company or its board of directors or when the company’s 
governance structure limited a sufficient control of the management. The landscape of shareholder activism 
advanced in the 1990s due to changed regulations by the SEC in the U.S. Shareholders were now allowed 
to communicate more flexible, get access to corporate shareholder lists and vote more easily for individual 
board members (Akhigbe et al., 1997). Due to additional regulative changes in the following years, like new 
diversification requirements, insider trading regulations and conflict of interest guidelines, institutional 
investors engaged themselves in fewer activist cases (Brav et al., 2008).  
After the changed regulations for mutual and investment funds, fund managers started to look for 
profitable alternative investment vehicles. This development in combination with overall decreased 
financial transaction, research, communication and leverage costs was beneficial for the whole alternative 
investment sector, especially the hedge fund and private equity industry (Cheffins and Armour, 2011). As 
Gillan and Starks (2007) mention, these fund types have become increasingly important players in financial 
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markets, particularly in their capacity as monitors of corporate performance and agents of change. The 
investment philosophy of active hedge funds and private equity funds is in most instances determined to 
influence the target company, its management and corporate governance in the shareholders’ interest 
(Mietzner et al., 2011). The corresponding compensation of the fund managers is in both cases mainly based 
on the funds’ performance (Achleitner et al., 2010). In most instances, hedge funds invest their own capital 
to acquire minority stakes (normally 5% at the most) in the targeted publicly listed company ((Boyson and 
Mooradian, 2012), (Mietzner and Schweizer, 2014), (Achleitner et al., 2010)). In contrast, private equity 
funds typically acquire major stakes or become principal shareholders in strong companies. Due to their 
large amount of invested capital, a profitable exit strategy is very important for private equity funds 
((Schwartzman and Snyder, 2007), (Thomas and Young, 2006)).  
Both, hedge funds and private equity funds, are perfectly suited as research subjects for this 
dissertation on shareholder activism, due to their importance as major alternative investors and their business 
model to pursue active investment strategies. The research focus on Continental Europe in general and on 
Germany with its – compared to Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions – different corporate environment and corporate 
governance system in particular made it necessary to consider an additional relevant investor group, the 
group of family business investors, as third research subject. For the first time, a study compares the 
investment behaviour of family business investors with hedge funds and private equity funds and puts them 
into the context of shareholder activism. To simplify matters, the term shareholder activists will incorporate 
hedge funds, private equity funds and family business investors in the remainder of this dissertation. The 
differences between the corporate environments and governance systems will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
I.3. Specifics of Continental European Corporate Governance and 
Corporate Environment 
Compared to the U.S., shareholder activism is still less researched in Continental Europe. Some reasons for 
that are the specifics of the corporate governance system and corporate environment in major Continental 
European countries like Germany, France and Italy. To demonstrate the importance of in-depth clinical 
studies as considerable contribution to the research on shareholder activism in Continental Europe, the key 
differences between these jurisdictions will be briefly presented in the following.  
Compared to the one-tier system in the U.S., countries like Germany, Austria and Switzerland have 
a two-tier governance system where the executive board (Vorstand) is responsible for managing the day-to-
day operations monitored by the independent supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). The members of a typical 
supervisory board like for example in Germany are elected for up to 5 years (Thamm, 2013). Despite a 
lower protection of private property of outside investors in Continental European civil law countries 
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compared to Anglo-Saxon common law countries (La Porta et al., 2000), the shareholder structures in 
Continental Europe are characterized by a high amount of large single investors like founders and families. 
Especially the German corporate environment with its many small- and medium sized private companies is 
characterized by a concentrated ownership structure and reciprocal shareholdings as well as its domination 
by founders, their families and other family business entrepreneurs ((Bassen and Zöllner, 2009) and (Bessler 
and Holler, 2008)). In contrast to the U.K., a study from Franks et al. (2008) shows that family controlled 
blocks are the most important category of ownership in Italy, France and Germany. Of combined more than 
550 of the largest listed companies in the four countries, 61.3% companies in Italy are family owned, 48.1% 
in France and 32.3% in Germany compared to 5.3% in the U.K. The study summarises that family ownership 
in Continental Europe is internationally at the high end and is in the U.S., Japan and U.K. among the lowest 
worldwide. 
 
I.4. Research on Shareholder Activism 
Due to its U.S. origins, the research on U.S. shareholder activism is much more comprehensive than the 
research on shareholder activism in the U.K. and Continental Europe. Another reason for the unequal 
distribution of studies is the availability of extensive data on activist cases in the U.S. as the SEC requires 
detailed information from each investor on his activist engagement (see for example its 13D filing). The 
information can be accessed centrally and digital and therefore are easy to use for research purpose. In 
contrast to the disclosure requirements of the SEC, the authorities of Continental European jurisdictions, 
especially in Germany and France, do not require a specific official filing which covers a shareholder activist 
case and underlying purpose of the engagement (for example the German legislator BaFin demands a public 
notification only if a share purchase exceeds or falls below a specific threshold level like 3%1). Due to the 
different disclosure obligations in Continental Europe, relevant data must be hand-collected from various 
sources.  
Independent from the origin of the research, i.e. Anglo-Saxon or Continental European, and its 
source of data, i.e. database inquiry or hand-collected, the study results on shareholder activism do not 
provide consistent results. Large sample studies on shareholder activism primarily examine this three 
different topics:  
1. The value enhancing effect of shareholder activism measured by abnormal stock market returns 
of the target companies via short- and/or long-term event studies,  
2. The operational and financial performance of the target companies prior to the activist 
engagement, and 
                                                          
1 See §21 and §26 Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz; WpHG). 
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3. The medium- and long-term development of the target companies following the activists’ 
investment.  
 
Table I.1. summarizes the most relevant quantitative large sample studies on shareholder activism structured 
by the three topics mentioned above and geographies. To present a comprehensive overview of the existing 
research on shareholder activism in general, I did not deliberately focus on specific activist shareholder 
groups, like pension funds, hedge funds, private equity or family business investors, but took all studies into 
consideration which cover potential activist engagements as such. The geographic classification of the 
studies enables the comparison and identification of potential regional specifics of shareholder activism, 
especially between Anglo-Saxon and Continental European countries. 
 
Table I.1. Results of most relevant quantitative Sample Studies on Shareholder Activism ordered 
according to the Geographic Focus 
 Observation 
period /regional 
focus / sample 
size 
Short- and long-
term stock price 
effects (CAR) 
Target firm 
characteristics  
Medium- and 
long-term 
development 
Focus on the U.S. 
Akhigbe et al. 
(1997)  
 
1985-1992 / U.S. / 
144 
Significant CAR 
of 9.27% at the 
end of the first 
year following the 
activist event and 
23.06% at the end 
of the third year  
No analysis No analysis 
Bethel et al., 
(1998)  
 
1980-1989 / U.S. / 
244 
Significant CAR 
of 14.2% for a 61-
day event window 
of a activist block 
purchase 
Focus on poor 
performing (i.e. 
ROA), smaller and 
more diversified 
firms 
Increase in 
operating 
profitability 
(ROA) in the 
years two and 
three following 
the activist 
investment 
Boyson and 
Mooradian (2007)  
1994-2005 / U.S. / 
418 
Significant CAR 
of 8.13% for a 51-
day event window  
Activist hedge 
funds target small 
firms with poor 
stock performance 
but high ROA 
Improved short- 
and long-term 
performance with 
regard to lower 
cash level and 
higher ROA 
Brav et al. (2008)  2001-2006 / U.S. / 
1.059 
Significant CAR 
of 8.4% for a 41-
day event window 
Hedge funds target 
profitable firms 
with low market 
value relative to 
book value and 
Overall improved 
performance (i.e. 
with regard to 
ROA and 
operating profit 
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sound operating 
cash flow 
margins) of target 
firms at the end of 
the first year 
following the 
activist event 
Brav et al. (2009)  2001-2007 / U.S. / 
1.172 
Positive CAR for 
a 41-day event 
window  
Focus on small 
low growth 
companies that are 
profitable and 
have high leverage 
Higher ROA at the 
end of the second 
year following the 
activist event 
Clifford (2008) 
 
1998-2005 / U.S. / 
197 
Significant CAR 
of 3.39% for a 5-
day event window 
for activist hedge 
fund targets and 
22.32% excess 
return for activist 
targets during the 
year following the 
event 
Firms targeted by 
activist hedge 
funds have a 
higher ROA and 
ROE as well as a 
low level of cash 
ROA increases by 
1.22% in the year 
following the 
activist event 
Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) 
1993-2006 / U.S. / 
980 
Significant CAR 
of 3.53% for a 15-
day event window 
and 9.67% for an 
event window of 
19 months 
Focus on small, 
underperforming 
firms 
No significant 
change in ROA, 
operating ROA, 
payout ratio, asset 
growth and share 
growth but 
increase of 
leverage and 
decrease of capex 
Klein and Zur 
(2006)  
2003-2005 / U.S. / 
319 
Significant CAR 
of 10.3% for a 61-
day event window 
and significant 
one-year BHAR 
of 16.5% 
Hedge funds target 
profitable and 
healthy firms with 
above-average 
cash holdings 
EPS, ROA and 
ROE decline in 
the year following 
the activist event 
Klein and Zur 
(2009) 
 
2003-2005 / U.S. / 
305 
Significant CAR 
of 10.2% for a 61-
day event window 
for activist hedge 
fund targets and 
11.35% at the end 
of the first year 
following the 
activist event 
Compared to other 
activists, hedge 
funds target more 
profitable and 
financially healthy 
firms with higher 
cash levels 
In the year 
following the 
activist event, 
hedge fund targets 
have higher 
dividends and 
long-term debts as 
well as lower cash 
levels and short-
term investments  
Focus on Europe and/or European countries 
Achleitner et al. 
(2010) 
1998-2007 / 
Germany / 249 
No analysis Hedge funds target 
firms with free 
cash flow 
problems and a 
lack of controlling 
No analysis 
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shareholders 
whereas private 
equity funds are 
focusing on firms 
with the potential 
to increase 
leverage 
Becht et al. 
(2010a) 
 
2000-2008 / 
Europe / 362 
Significant CAR 
of 6.90% for a 41-
day period around 
initial disclosure  
No analysis No analysis 
Bessler and 
Holler (2008)  
2000-2006 / 
Germany / 324 
Significant CAR 
of 3.49% for a 31-
day event window 
and BHAR of 
19.93% at the end 
of the first year 
following the 
activist event 
Focus on less 
profitable 
companies, i.e. 
with regard to 
ROE, ROA and 
EPS 
No analysis  
Croci (2007) 1990-2001 / 
Europe / 136 
Significant CAR 
of 9.12% for a 36-
day window and 
significant long-
run abnormal 
returns if raiders 
sell their shares 
Focus on large 
firms with stable 
stock price 
performance 
No evidence 
found that raiders 
improve target 
firm performance 
Cziraki et al. 
(2010) 
 
1998-2008 / 
Europe / 290 
No analysis Focus on 
underperforming 
firms with low 
leverage 
No analysis 
Drerup (2011)  1999-2010 / 
Germany / 278 
Significant CAR 
of 3.47% for a 41-
day event window 
and insignificant 
BHAR -6.1% at 
the end of the first 
year following the 
activist event 
Target companies 
of activist hedge 
funds are neither 
extraordinarily 
profitable 
nor unprofitable 
No significant 
changes or 
improvements 
following the 
activist investment 
Mietzner et al.  
(2011)  
 
2001-2009 / 
Germany / 249 
Significant CAR 
of 5.41% (hedge 
fund targets) and 
7.61% (private 
equity targets) for 
a 41-day event 
window  
Compared to its 
peers, the target 
companies of 
hedge funds and 
private equity 
funds have lower 
cash holdings but 
hedge funds tend 
to extract liquidity 
from their targets 
following the 
investment 
No analysis 
Mietzner and 
Schweizer (2014)  
1993-2007 / 
Germany / 226 
Significant CAR 
of 6.24% (hedge 
Compared to 
private equity 
No analysis 
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fund targets) and 
3.55% (private 
equity targets) for 
a 41 -day event 
window; BHAR 
of  
-21.46% (hedge 
fund targets) and  
-2.47% (private 
equity targets) 
over a 250-day 
period 
funds, hedge funds 
tend to acquire 
smaller stakes of 
smaller companies  
Stadler (2010) 2000-2008 / 
Germany / 136 
Significant CAR 
of 1.23% for a 5-
day event 
window; non-
significant BHAR 
of -0.94% for a 7-
months event 
window 
No analysis No analysis 
Thamm (2013) / 
Thamm and 
Schiereck (2014) 
1999-2011 / 
Germany / 140 
Significant CAR 
of 4.36% for a 41-
day event window 
if an activist 
investor 
approaches a 
target in a true 
active / hostile 
manner 
Focus on firms 
with positive ROE 
but 
underperforming 
share price 
No analysis 
Other relevant research on shareholder activism 
Karpoff (2001)  Review of 25 
empirical studies 
on shareholder 
activism 
Analysis of value 
effects of 
shareholder 
proposals: little 
evidence of short-
term value 
creation and 
contradictory 
results regarding 
increased share 
values of target 
companies in the 
long run 
Shareholder 
activists target 
large firms with 
poor stock returns 
and profitability 
prior to the activist 
investment 
Shareholder 
activism does not 
lead to operational 
improvements of 
the target 
companies  
Judge et al. 
(2010)   
2003-2007 / U.S., 
U.K., Australia, 
Japan, Germany 
and South Korea / 
234 
No analysis (Financially-
driven) 
shareholder 
activists target less 
profitable firms 
No analysis 
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As shown by Table I.1.and independent from its regional focus, the majority of quantitative large sample 
studies observes positive abnormal share price returns following the public filing of a share purchase by an 
activist shareholder. Only a few studies do not detect a value enhancing effect of an activist engagement. 
Drerup (2011) and Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) find negative buy and hold abnormal returns at the end 
of the first year following the activist event, Stadler (2010) at the end of the first six months. The meta study 
of Karpoff (2001) who reviews 25 empirical studies on shareholder activism finds contradictory results with 
regards to the long-term value creation. 
An analysis of the target firm characteristics presents contradictory results as well. Some studies 
identify poor performance as key criterion of an engagement by activists where this assessment is based on 
the company’s financial performance indicators like a low ROA and ROE. For example Bethel et al. (1998) 
and Bessler and Holler (2008) show a negative correlation between the profitability level of a company and 
its possibility to become an activist target. Other studies complement that target companies generally have 
a lower market valuation, growth rates and leverage. But some studies contradict these findings. According 
to for example Klein and Zur (2006 and 2009), activists are targeting profitable and financially healthy 
companies with liquidity above average. Brav et al. (2009), Thamm (2013) and Thamm and Schiereck 
(2014) also identified profitability as key criterion of an activist engagement. The target company of the 
study of Boyson and Mooradian (2007) is a cash cow with poor growth prospects but a high ROA.  
The analyses of the medium- and long-term impact of shareholder activism on target companies do 
not give definite results as well. Some studies determine an improved financial performance, expressed by 
the key performance indicators ROA and ROE ((Clifford, 2008), (Bethel et al., 1998), (Boyson and 
Mooradian, 2007) and (Brav et al., 2009)), which is mainly driven by the divesture of under-performing 
assets following the activist engagement. Boyson and Mooradian (2007) and Klein and Zur (2009) 
additionally find an increased extraction of cash subsequent to the activist event. On the other hand, 
Greenwood and Schor (2009), Croci (2007) and Drerup (2011) do not find significant improvements or 
changes of the target firms’ earnings or operating performance. Additionally, the regional classification of 
Table I.1. shows that most of the studies with focus on Continental Europe or Continental European 
countries lack to examine the medium- and long-term development of the target companies following the 
activist investment. This dissertation therefore complements the sparse existing research on the medium- 
and long-term impact of shareholder activism on firms in Continental Europe.  
Summarising the review of the existing research, it can be stated that independent from the regional 
focus of the studies no definite results have been obtained with regards to target firm characteristics, value 
enhancing effects of shareholder activism and its medium and long-term impact on the target firms. There 
are a variety of reasons for the mixed results: the use of different quality of data, i.e. database inquiry vs. 
hand-collected, or the use of different points of time of share purchases by the activists, or the availability 
of relevant data in general based on the different national publication requirements. For example, Brav et 
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al. (2009) as well as Klein and Zur (2009) use publicly available data whereas Becht et al. (2010a) 
incorporate transaction data of private, i.e. non-public, approaches.  
Furthermore, the review shows the relatively small amount of studies on shareholder activism in 
Continental Europe in general and Germany in specific. Despite some prominent public cases in the past, 
the research on shareholder activism in Continental Europe is still at an early stage. These findings are 
important for the structure and design of this dissertation as well as for the development of the hypotheses 
(see section I.6.). To fil the existing research gap and to provide valuable results, the dissertation focuses on 
major Continental European countries like Germany, France, Austria and Switzerland (German speaking 
but non-EU) and the specifics of the corporate governance systems and corporate environments in 
Continental Europe via in-depth clinical studies (see for example Bessiere et al. (2010) and their motivation 
to conduct a clinical study). 
 
I.5. Theoretical Framework 
This dissertation and most of its incorporated analyses like short- and long-term event studies are based on 
the principal-agent-theory. This theory combines different academic disciplines and is often applied to the 
separation of ownership and control and the occurring conflicts. The issue has been described by academics 
for some time (see for example Berle and Means, 1932) but it became known for a wider audience following 
the work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) who formulated the concept of agency costs for the first time.  
With regards to the corporate world, the agency theory addresses governance issues which could 
arise when the agent, e.g. company executives, makes decisions on behalf of his principal, e.g. company 
shareholders, but acts in his own best interest rather than in the best interest of his principal. The costs which 
are associated with this potential conflict of interest are known as agency costs. The agency theory states 
that the agency costs could negatively affect the value of a firm as they can arise from an enhanced 
monitoring of the executives or a comprehensive provision of information (Bassen and Zöllner, 2009). 
Professional investors like shareholder activists who acquire a significant stake in a company could be able 
to enforce a stricter monitoring of the management and therefore help to restrict the management’s 
possibilities to act in their own bDie est interest ((Gillan and Starks, 1998) and (Nordén and Strand, 2011)).  
In order to assess the impact of an activist investment on the firm value, short- and long-term event 
studies have been conducted in this dissertation. An increase of the share price – respectively a positive 
abnormal return at the time of the public announcement of an activist investment – indicates that the capital 
market assumes a more effective monitoring of the company’s management and thus a simultaneous 
reduction of the company’s agency costs.  
 
11 
 
 
I.6. Development of Hypotheses 
Due to the different corporate environment in Continental European compared to Anglo-Saxonian 
jurisdictions, I examine whether a shareholder activist could execute his investment strategy in an equally 
successful manner here as an activist in the U.S. or the U.K. as well as I analyse a broader definition of 
activist investors which seems to be more suitable for Continental Europe.  
In the last years, a new player entered the stage of active investing in Continental Europe – family 
business investors. This investment group is a typical element of the Continental European corporate 
environment, especially in Germany, France and Italy. Family business investors invest increasing amounts 
of money to acquire major stakes in target companies striving for example for adequate board 
representations to exert their dominating influence. Therefore, I test whether the investment approach and 
strategy of family business investors in Continental Europe differ significantly from classical representatives 
of the shareholder activism guild, i.e. activist hedge funds and private equity funds.  
The theoretical framework of this dissertation is based on the principal-agent-theory (see section 
I.5.) and the correlated assumption of the existence of agency costs. A positive share price reaction at the 
time of notification of a stake purchase by a shareholder activist is the direct anticipation of the capital 
market that the activist is able to reduce the agency costs of the target firm via its superior qualifications to 
efficiently integrate, manage and control the target firm. Due to the positive image as long-term oriented, 
stable and conservative investor, I assume that the capital market values the stake purchased by a family 
business investor higher than by an activist hedge fund or private equity fund. 
 
I.7. Remarks on the Collection of Data and Test Statistics 
In comparison to the disclosure requirements of the SEC (for example see its 13D filing), the authorities of 
Continental European jurisdictions, especially in Germany and France, do not require a specific official 
filing which covers a shareholder activist case and underlying purpose of the engagement. For example, the 
German legislator demands a public notification if a share purchase exceeds or falls below a specific 
threshold level like 3%.2 The legal requirements in other Continental European countries like France3 and 
Switzerland4 are quite similar.  
For that reason and due to the lack of a cross-national European data base for shareholder activist 
cases, all data used in this dissertation have been hand-collected for each specific study and underlying 
research question in a work-intensive approach. Despite the different research focus of the three studies, the 
identification process of relevant activist cases and involved parties, i.e. activist hedge funds, private equity 
funds and family business investors, is quite similar. Factiva, a database focused on media news, and 
                                                          
2 See §21 and §26 Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz; WpHG). 
3 See § L233-7 Trading Act (Code de commerce). 
4 See §20 Securities Exchange Act (Bundesgesetz über die Börsen und den Effektenhandel; BEHG). 
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Bloomberg, a financial information database, helped to identify relevant activist cases, the level of share 
purchases as well as the underlying purpose of the activists’ engagement.5  
I filtered the results for publicly listed companies only and – due to the different accounting rules 
of financial service companies – excluded banks, insurance and real estate companies from the list as well. 
The pre-selection was completed by checking the corresponding voting rights announcements – if existing 
– via the websites of the target companies as well as ad-hoc disclosures. To conduct the analyses of target 
firm characteristics as well as their medium- and long-term operative and financial development following 
the activist engagement, all relevant financial information have been compiled via Bloomberg and partially 
via hand-collection by means of the companies’ annual reports. If needed for a specific study, the same 
approach has been used to compile a group of peer companies. To analyse the share price reactions in the 
course of the public announcements of an approach by an activist shareholder, the event study methodology 
has been applied. If the specific entry date was missing due to the lack of filing data, I defined the day of 
the first public announcement, e.g. via press statements, of the investment as event day (t=0). The time 
periods of the three studies differ little from each other. Overall the analysed time period comprises the 
years 1999 to 2012 which covers several phases of extreme stock market developments, i.e. two periods of 
rising stock prices (2003 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012) and the global financial crisis between the years 2008 
and 2009. 
 
To examine the various hypotheses (see section I.6.) on shareholder activism and its protagonists, different 
statistic tests have been applied to primarily detect differences in the analysed investor groups and their 
approaches, stock market reactions, changes of the operating and financial performance of the target 
companies prior, during and following the activist engagement as well as to predict the possibility that a 
specific active investor group approaches a company with specific parameters. This section briefly 
summarizes the most relevant statistical tests which have been applied in the three studies.  
To find any statistically relevant differences and changes between the compiled target companies 
and control samples like peer companies or benchmark stock indices, the parametric t-Test6, the non-
parametric Mann-Whitney U-Test7 and Wilcoxon Signed Rank-Test8 have been applied in most of the 
analyses used in this dissertation and are briefly presented below. The t-Test is a difference-in-means test 
with the standard test statistic  
                                                          
5 Selected sources are amongst others the leading news agencies Reuters and Dow Jones as well as Germany’s leading 
daily newspapers Bild Zeitung, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Handelsblatt and Süddeutsche Zeitung. 
6 See Brown and Warner (1980). 
7 See Mann and Whitney (1947). 
8 See Wilcoxon (1945). 
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𝑡 =  
𝑋1 −  𝑋2
𝜎𝑋1−𝑋2
 
where 𝑋1 and 𝑋2 are the means of the two samples and 𝜎𝑋1−𝑋2 measures the variability of the differences 
between the sample means. The Mann-Whitney U-Test is a difference-in-medians test with a standard test 
statistic  
𝑈 =  𝑁1𝑁2 +
𝑁1(𝑁1 + 1)
2
− 𝑅1 
where 𝑁1 and 𝑁2 are the number of cases in sample 1 and sample 2, and 𝑅1 is the sum of the ranks for the 
first sample. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank-Test is another non-parametric difference-in-medians test with a 
standard test statistic 
𝑧 =
𝑅 − 𝜇𝑅
𝜎𝑅
 
where 𝜇𝑅𝑖𝑠 
𝑛1(𝑛1+𝑛2+1)
2
, 𝜎𝑅𝑖𝑠 √
𝑛1𝑛2(𝑛1+𝑛2+1)
12
, R is the sum of ranks for smaller sample size (𝑛1), 𝑛1 is the 
smaller of sample sizes, 𝑛2 is the larger of sample sizes, 𝑛1 ≥ 10 and 𝑛2 ≥ 10. Comparing the target firms 
with its peers, these tests have been applied to analyse the characteristics of the target firms, their changes 
in operating performance as well as short- and long-term stock performance via event studies. 
 
Additionally, the statistical significance of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) calculated in the short- 
and long-term event studies has been tested by the Boehmer Test and the non-parametric Corrado Rank Test 
as robustness checks. The test statistic of the Boehmer Test is  
𝑡𝐵 =
𝐴√𝑛
𝑠
 
where  𝐴 is the average of standardized abnormal returns over the sample of 𝑛 firms of the event day, and 𝑠 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of standardized abnormal returns. For conducting the Corrado Rank 
Test each firm’s abnormal returns have to be transformed into their respective rank first. The test statistic 
of the Corrado Rank Test at day 0 is 
𝑅 =
1
𝑁
∑ (𝐾𝑖0 − ?̅?)
𝑁
𝐼=1
𝑆(𝐾)
 
where 𝐾𝑖𝑡 denotes the rank of the abnormal return 𝜀𝑖𝑡  in security i’s time series of T excess returns where 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝜀𝑖𝑗 means 𝐾𝑖𝑡 ≥ 𝐾𝑖𝑗 and 𝑇 ≥ 𝐾𝑖𝑡 ≥ 1, the average rank ?̅? =  
𝑇+1
2
 and the standard deviation 𝑆(𝐾) 
which is computed as  
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𝑆(𝐾) = √
1
𝑇
∑ [∑(𝐾𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?)/𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
]
2𝑇
𝑡=1
 
 
Short- and long-term event studies provide information about the positive or negative stock price reactions 
of target firms which are approached publicly by an activist shareholder. These event studies are based on 
the calculation of abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of the stock market listed 
target firms using a standard market model.9 The abnormal return 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the difference between the target 
company’s actual return 𝑅𝑖𝑡 on the event day t with 𝑡 = 0 and the expected return on day t where 𝑅𝑚𝑡 is the 
return of the market portfolio on day t:  
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − (?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡) 
?̂?𝑖 and ?̂?𝑖 are the coefficients calculated from an ordinary least squares-regression of the daily stock returns 
of target company i on the market return over an estimation period. The CAR is the sum of all daily abnormal 
returns and CAAR is the mean cumulative abnormal return.   
 
To predict the probability that a firm could become an investment target of either a single activist 
shareholder or a group of activists, selected key performance indicators of the target companies have been 
used to conduct a logistic regression. To model the conditional probability Pr(Y=1|X=x) as a function of x 
with a binary output variable y, the logistic regression model is  
log
𝑝(𝑥)
1 − 𝑝(𝑥)
= 𝛽0 + 𝑥 ∗ 𝛽 
where solving for p is 𝑝(𝑥; 𝑏, 𝑤) =
𝑒𝛽0+𝑥∗𝛽
1+𝑒𝛽0+𝑥∗𝛽
=
1
1+𝑒−(𝛽0+𝑥∗𝛽)
 . 
 
A multiple regression model is needed to predict whether selected financial performance indicators of the 
target firms affect the intensity of the stock market reaction when an activist approach becomes public. The 
model allows 𝑘 different independent variables to affect 𝑦 as dependent variable. The formula is: 
𝑦 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥1 + 𝛽2𝑥2 + 𝛽3𝑥3+. . . +𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑘 + 𝑢  
where 𝛽0 is the intercept, 𝛽𝑘 is the regression coefficient, 𝑥𝑘 is the respective control variable, 𝑢 is the error 
term and 𝑦 the dependent variable, i.e. in this case CARs of two different event windows (CAR3 = [𝑡 −
1; 𝑡 + 1] and CAR21 = [𝑡 − 10; 𝑡 + 10]).  
                                                          
9 See Brown and Warner (1985). The standard market model used in this dissertation is based on an estimation 
window of 252 trading days ending 10 days prior to the event day, i.e. [𝑡 − 262; 𝑡 − 10]. Due to the focus of this 
dissertation on Continental Europe, I used the Stoxx Europe 600 as benchmarking index. The index represents 600 
large, medium and small public listed European companies. With the parameters calculated via the estimation 
window, I computed the expected, abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the different event windows.  
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To analyse the impact of an activist approach on the target company, I choose the DuPont model which was 
first applied by the U.S. DuPont Corporation in the 1920s as operating and financial control instrument. 
This model is used to evaluate a company’s financial condition by comparing various key financials from 
the income statement and balance sheet (see for example Milbourn and Haight, 2005) expressed by the 
company’s return on equity (ROE):  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
=
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
∗
𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)
∗
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
∗
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
∗
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
  
The formula incorporates three major parts: the company’s profit margin, asset turnover and equity 
multiplier. Due to its model kit like approach, these operating figures could be broke down into more specific 
and interpretable financial figures and ratios (Soliman, 2008).  
  
I.8. Presentation of Studies and Contribution to Literature 
I.8.1. First Study: A Clinical Study of the Investments of Wyser-Pratte in Continental 
Europe 
“A Clinical Study of the Investments of Wyser-Pratte in Continental Europe” is the first study which 
analyses the investments of one single shareholder activist who operates in relatively similar Continental 
European jurisdictions. The format as an in-depth clinical study enables to gather detailed information about 
the whole investment and engagement process in – compared to Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions – a different 
corporate environment.  
The study perfectly complements the sparse existing literature on single shareholder activists like 
the studies from Smith (1996) and Crutchley et al. (1998) on the California Public Employees' Retirement 
System (CalPERS), Carleton et al. (1998) on Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College 
Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) and Becht et al. (2010b) on Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUKFF). 
The study from Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010) on U.S. shareholder activist Carl Icahn acts as a role model 
for my clinical study. Therefore, the contribution to literature of the first study is (i) providing the first 
examination of the investment behaviour of a single activist investor with focus on Continental Europe, (ii) 
complementing the limited amount of studies on single shareholder activists, (iii) complementing the sparse 
research on shareholder activism in Continental Europe, (iv) providing a comprehensive insight into the 
whole investment approach, the demands and success of one single activist investor, (v) an analysis of the 
operating performance of the target companies following the activist approach in more detail which has not 
definitely been clarified by studies so far (see for example Bessiere et al., 2010, and their motivation to 
conduct a clinical study), and (vi) comparing the findings of the study with the results of large sample 
studies. 
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I.8.2. Second Study: Shareholder Activism by Family Business Investors: The Clinical 
Study of German KUKA AG 
“Shareholder Activism by Family Business Investors: The Clinical Study of German KUKA AG” 
complements my first study on the investments of U.S. shareholder activist Wyser-Pratte in Continental 
Europe. Against the background of an increased deal activity of family business investors in Continental 
Europe and Germany in recent years10, the confrontation between a classical shareholder activist and a 
typical German famdeily business investor on the German mid-cap machine manufacturer KUKA is one of 
the most prominent activist cases of the past years in Germany.  
For the first time, this in-depth clinical case study places family business investors in the context of 
shareholder activists. The contribution to literature of this study is (i) providing detailed insights into the 
whole investment approach of a shareholder activist in Germany, (ii) examining the specific role of a family 
business investor as activist shareholder, (iii) analysing the operating and financial performance of the target 
company prior, during and following the activism process, (iv) bringing this specific German case and its 
underlying corporate environment into the context of shareholder activism, and (v) comparing the findings 
of the study with the results of large sample studies. 
 
I.8.3. Third Study: Family Business Investors versus Private Equity Investors – The Case 
of Continental Europe  
„Family Business Investors versus Private Equity Investors – The Case of Continental Europe” enhances 
the research focus of the second study and complements its findings with a comparison of the investment 
activities of Continental European family business investors and private equity firms.  
With its comprehensive focus on Continental European family business investors, the study 
perfectly concludes this dissertation and the findings of my previous two studies as well as helps to clarify 
if research on shareholder activism in Continental Europe should be complemented by family business 
investors in future as additional study group. Private equity firms are well suited as peer group for the family 
business investors as these firms also often acquire larger stakes in the target companies – compared to 
activist hedge funds – and could therefore exert their influence on the companies and its management and 
supervisory bodies. 
                                                          
10 Recent examples of these investment activities of German family investors are the hostile takeovers of Continental 
by Schaeffler and Volkswagen by Porsche as well as the share purchases of Klöckner & Co. by Knauf, of Douglas 
Holding by Müller or of Vossloh by family investor Heinz Hermann Thiele ((Lehmann-Tolkmitt and Wattendrup, 2011) 
and (Becker, 2013)). 
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The contribution to literature of this study is (i) providing an overview of family business investors 
as typical element of the Continental European corporate environment, (ii) a review of the existing research 
on the investment and acquisition activities of family business investors in Continental Europe, (iii) a 
comparison of the investment activities of family business investors and private equity investors in the 
context of shareholder activism for the first time, (iv) a comprehensive analysis of the differences and 
similarities of these investor groups throughout the entire investment process, and (v) a comparison of the 
findings of this study with relevant large sample studies.  
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II. A Clinical Study of the Investments of Wyser-Pratte in Continental 
Europe 
 
Summary11 
This paper analyses the investments of U.S. activist investor Guy Wyser-Pratte in listed companies in 
Germany, France, Austria and Switzerland between the years 2001 and 2011. Wyser-Pratte is the best 
known single activist investor in Continental Europe whose investments have typically been followed 
intensively by the press. For the first time, this study examines the investment activities of a single activist 
investor with key focus on Continental Europe and complements the few existing studies on single activist 
investors and their focus on Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. The results show that he approaches poor 
performing companies, i.e. unprofitable and undervalued, and that his investment activities increase the 
short- and long-term shareholder value. Key differentiator to existing research is the focus of Wyser-Pratte 
on improving the profitability of his target companies. This new insight can be interpreted as an indicator 
that value generation by shareholder activism works different in the institutional setting of Continental 
Europe and it differentiates my study from recent mainly Anglo-Saxon based research.  
  
                                                          
11 The chapter II. of this dissertation is largely based on the joint working paper of Bassen/Schiereck/Schüler with 
the title A Clinical Study of the Investments of Wyser-Pratte in Continental Europe 
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II.1. Introduction 
Following the first wave of Anglo-Saxon shareholder activism spreading over to Continental Europe at the 
beginning of the new millennium, recent data again showed an increase of actions against companies by 
activist shareholders of 88% between the years 2010 and 2013 with focus on Europe and the U.S. ((Gillan 
and Starks, 2007), (Linklaters, 2013)). It is expected that alternative investors will continue with actions 
against European companies searching for cash and low market valuations ((Hirt and Hübner 9/25/2013), 
(Rozwadowski and Young, 2005)).  
The shareholder activism movement has its seeds in the emergence of agency conflicts between 
shareholders (principals) and the responsible corporate managers (agents) and debuted in the U.S. around 
the 1970s and 1980s (Jensen, 1986). Favored by changed regulation rules and as successors of the aggressive 
corporate raiders, hedge funds successively became the key players of global shareholder activism 
((Cheffins and Armour, 2011), (Boyson and Mooradian, 2012)). Hedge fund managers swiftly realized that 
they could actively influence and change managerial decisions as minority shareholders to unlock potential 
value and maximize their own profits (Marler and Faugère, 2010). Following the dry spell phase during the 
financial crisis, activism seems to be a lucrative approach more relevant than ever (Hilldrup, 2012). 
Due to its U.S. origins, most research focuses on U.S. based shareholder activism and investors; 
only a few studies analyze this corporate governance issue in the U.K. or even less in Continental European 
countries. Some studies illustrate the value increasing effects of shareholder activism through positive short- 
and long-term abnormal stock market returns ((Akhigbe et al., 1997), (Becht et al., 2010a), (Boyson and 
Mooradian, 2007), (Brav et al., 2008), (Clifford, 2008)).12 Other studies doubt these positive effects, 
especially with regard to long-term benefits like an improved operating performance ((Drerup, 2011), 
(Gillan and Starks, 2007), (Karpoff, 2001)).  
The main objective of this study is to tackle primarily two topics which have barely been covered 
by empirical research so far. First, with Guy Wyser-Pratte I focus my efforts on one single active investor 
only. There are just a few studies that enable a comprehensive insight into the specific approach, demands 
and success of one activist investor executing his investment strategy ((Smith, 1996), (Crutchley et al., 
1998), (Smythe et al., 2015),  (Becht et al., 2010b), (Venkiteshwaran et al., 2010)).13 All these active 
investors are focused on Anglo-Saxon markets. In contrast to large-sample studies, an in-depth clinical study 
helps to examine aspects like the whole investment approach, i.e. from targeting to exiting, and sustainable 
operating performance in more detail which have not definitely been clarified by studies so far (see for 
example Bessiere et al. (2010) and their motivation to conduct a clinical study). And second, my analysis 
                                                          
12 See for example Akhigbe et al. (1997): positive CAR of 9.27% to 23.06% between the first and third year following 
an activist event; Becht et al. (2010a): positive abnormal returns of 11.4%; Boyson and Mooradian (2007): 9%-11%; 
Brav et al. (2008): 7%-8%; and a good summary of Clifford (2008).   
13 See Smith (1996), Crutchley et al. (1998), Smythe et al. (2015) concerning the institutional U.S. investor CalPERS, 
Becht et al. (2010b) on Hermes UK Focus Fund and Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010) on U.S. activist investor Carl Icahn. 
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focuses on Continental European jurisdictions, especially on Germany, France, Austria and Switzerland. 
The corporate environments as well as the shareholder rights in these countries considerably differ from 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions like U.K. or the U.S. These differences do influence the effectiveness of the 
respective activism ((Bessler and Holler, 2008), (La Porta et al., 2000), (Nili, 2014), (Schaefer and Hertrich, 
2013)).  
Additionally, the amount of research on shareholder activism in Europe, especially with focus on 
Germany as Europe’s largest economy, is still very low and partially differs regarding short- and long-term 
effects of activism ((Bessler and Holler, 2008), (Drerup, 2011), (Kühne, 2011), (Mietzner et al., 2011), 
(Schaefer and Hertrich, 2013), (Mietzner and Schweizer, 2014), (Stadler, 2010), (Thamm, 2013), (Weber 
and Zimmermann, 2013)). The format of this study is based upon the clinical study of Venkiteshwaran et 
al. (2010) who investigate the ability of famous U.S. activist investor Carl Icahn to generate long term 
shareholder value.  
 
My results show that Wyser-Pratte approaches poor performing companies, i.e. unprofitable and 
undervalued, and that his investment activities increase the short- and long-term shareholder value. I 
determine abnormal returns of 9.4% for a three-day and 6.2% for a 19-months event window. My study 
results differ from other research with regard to the operating development of the target companies of up to 
two years following the investment. Compared to the last financial year prior to the approach by Wyser-
Pratte, the companies show an increased profitability, higher cash holdings accompanied by a slightly higher 
dividend payout ratio and decreased leverage. The analysis suggests that Wyser-Pratte focuses his efforts 
more on improving the profitability of his target companies than on quick cash outs and capital structure 
adjustments like other activists often do. This new insight can be interpreted as an indicator that value 
generation by shareholder activism works different in the institutional setting of Continental Europe and it 
differentiates my study from recent mainly Anglo-Saxon based research. Finally, Wyser-Pratte is less 
successful in achieving his demands towards the target companies’ management and supervisory boards 
compared to other activist investors. 
 
The analysis proceeds as follows. The next paragraph reviews the literature on shareholder activism 
followed by some background information about Guy Wyser-Pratte. The following paragraph describes the 
data collection process and the methodology. The empirical results of the analysis will be presented in the 
next section followed by a comparison of the findings with other relevant studies. The last paragraph 
concludes the analysis. 
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II.2. Literature Overview on Shareholder Activism 
Agency conflicts, i.e. opposed interests between managers and shareholders, and the resolution of these 
conflicts have been the key rationale of shareholder activism ((Gillan and Starks, 1998), (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976)). Starting in the 1980s, investor groups like corporate raiders and pension funds 
increasingly expressed their dissatisfaction with company performances or governance issues through active 
involvement ((Brav et al., 2008), (Gillan and Starks, 1998)). Changed capital market regulations in the 
1990s, especially in the U.S. and triggered by the SEC, made it easier for shareholders to tackle companies 
and managers. In combination with lower costs for transactions, leverage and communication, shareholders 
were now allowed to communicate more flexible, get access to corporate shareholder lists and vote more 
easily for individual board members ((Cheffins and Armour, 2011), (Akhigbe et al., 1997)).  
Based on this development, new players entered the stage. Hedge funds and private equity firms 
stepwise became the most important representatives of activist shareholders and increasingly acted as 
monitors of corporate performance and agents of change (Gillan and Starks, 2007).  
Hedge funds and private equity firms are characterized by some commonalities. Both investors are 
privately organised limited investment firms, invest large amounts of own capital and have a compensation 
system which is closely linked to the respective fund performance. Major customers are for example 
professional mutual, investment and pension funds as well as wealthy individual investors ((Mietzner et al., 
2011), (Achleitner et al., 2010)). Hedge funds differ from private equity funds in some points. They could 
for example use additional financial instruments like derivatives or short selling positions to execute 
alternative investment strategies and to generate excess returns ((Kühne, 2011), (Rozwadowski and Young, 
2005)). Contrary to the acquisition of majority stakes by private equity firms, hedge funds normally acquire 
minority stakes which rarely exceed 5% of their target companies’ equity ((Mietzner et al., 2011), 
(Schwartzman and Snyder, 2007)).  
Focusing on the target firm characteristics, numerous studies identify poor performance, i.e. ROA 
and ROE, as key criterion of an approach by activists (see for example (Drerup, 2011), (Gillan and Starks, 
1998), (Bethel et al., 1998)). Judge et al. (2010) additionally show a negative correlation between 
profitability and the possibility to become an activist target. Additionally, target firms have a low market 
valuation, lower growth rates and low leverage ((Cziraki et al., 2010), (Brav et al., 2009), (Ellison et al., 
2008)). Contrary to the studies already mentioned, some research finds inconsistent results especially with 
regard to the profitability criterion. According to these studies, shareholder activists target profitable and 
financially healthy companies with above average liquidity ((Klein and Zur, 2009), (Klein and Zur, 2006), 
(Boyson and Mooradian, 2007)).  
Focusing on the value enhancing effects of shareholder activism, research is non-ambiguous as well. 
Large U.S. and European sample studies find these effects especially for the target shareholders and 
triggered by positive abnormal share price reactions in the course of the activist approach (see for example 
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(Akhigbe et al., 1997), (Boyson and Mooradian, 2007), (Clifford, 2008), (Mietzner and Schweizer, 2014), 
(Bessler and Holler, 2008), (Klein and Zur, 2009), (Brav et al., 2009), (Becht et al., 2010a)). Beside short-
term effects, some of these studies also mention positive long-term value effects which partially exceed the 
announcement returns. Compared to that Karpoff (2001) does not confirm these positive long-term effects, 
Drerup (2011) just describes market neutral returns and Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) even find negative 
long term buy-and-hold abnormal returns.  
The partially ambiguous results of relevant research perfectly express the complexity of the topic 
shareholder activism and the difficulty to make a clear statement concerning the impact of activism on target 
companies and their shareholders. The different results are mainly attributed to the varying jurisdictions, i.e. 
Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions vs. Continental European jurisdictions, and their different corporate governance 
and environment as well as on the use and quality of adequate data ((La Porta et al., 2000), (Karpoff, 2001)). 
I therefore decided to focus my analysis on one single shareholder activist only who operates in relatively 
similar Continental European jurisdictions. Additionally, my study adds relevant information to the sparse 
research on single shareholder activists. There are only very few studies like Smith (1996) and Crutchley et 
al. (1998) on the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS), Carleton et al. (1998) on 
Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF) and Becht 
et al. (2010b) on Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUKFF) and Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010) on Carl Icahn which 
acts as the role model of this study. But contrary to my study, they are focusing on investment activities in 
the Anglo-Saxon region.  
 
II.3. Background on Guy Wyser-Pratte 
Guy Patrick Wyser-Pratte, born in June 1940 in Vichy, France, is founder, CEO, President and COO of the 
employee owned investment company Wyser-Pratte Management Co., Inc. based in New York, United 
States. The firm is an investment vehicle for individuals or institutions like pension funds or trusts, managing 
various active investing funds which are focusing on undervalued especially European public listed 
companies. His major objective is always to achieve an increase in shareholder value following his 
investment. Generally, he focuses on conglomerates in the metal and defence industry with a high free float 
and acquires not more than 5% of a company’s outstanding shares. His company specific investment horizon 
varies from some months to several years. In 1991, Wyser-Pratte resurrected the former family firm, became 
an independent investment manager and acts as influential activist investor since then.  
With his engagement during the Vodafone Mannesmann takeover battle in 1999, he was one of the 
first foreign investors who brought the investment strategy of shareholder activism to corporate Germany. 
Answering the question of why he mainly focuses the investments of his EuroValue fund on German 
corporations, he said in an interview: ”In the United States, poor companies have poor prices. It's a different 
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situation in Germany. A company's stock can be floundering while real wealth is hidden somewhere in its 
books, sometimes even for decades. We're interested in that wealth.”14  
 
II.4. Data Collection and Methodology 
According to the main objective of this study, I concentrated the data collection on companies which have 
actively been targeted by Wyser-Pratte in Continental Europe. To guarantee proper documentation and data 
availability, I limited the analysis to the period from the year 2001 to 2011. This period has also been chosen 
due to the fact that it perfectly covers the peak of Wyser-Pratte’s activities in Europe.  
Compared to U.S. law, Continental European jurisdictions, especially Germany and France, do not 
require a specific official filing which covers the case and purpose of shareholder engagement (like the U.S. 
13D SEC filing). The German legislator only demands the public announcement of a shareholding in a listed 
company if it exceeds or falls below various thresholds beginning with 3%.15 The legal requirements in 
France16 as well as in Switzerland17 are quite similar.  
The identification of the companies targeted by Wyser-Pratte was hand collected and based on the 
following approach: first, I run a Factiva search18 looking for all press articles which incorporated 
information or statements with regard to Wyser-Pratte; second, I filtered the results for publicly listed 
companies which had actively been approached by Wyser-Pratte and third, I double checked the pre-
selection with the corresponding voting rights announcements – if existing – via the companies’ websites. 
Finally, I found 14 companies which were investment targets during the years 2001 and 2011. The selection 
primarily included German companies but also companies located in France, Switzerland and Austria.  
To conduct a proper analysis of the target companies’ operating performance and development 
prior, during and following the approach by Wyser-Pratte, I composed a control group. My objective was 
to find one comparable control firm for each target firm in the Continental European corporate environment 
with equal sector focus and business portfolio as well as unaffected by shareholder activism. But due to the 
conglomerate like structure of some target companies, I had to assign two control firms per target firm in 
three cases to properly match their corporate structure. The target firms’ analyst reports and its peer group 
section supported this selection process. Finally, I selected 17 control firms for my group of 14 target firms. 
As Bloomberg did not provide all necessary financial data, I decided to use hand collected data only to 
                                                          
14 See Hornig (2005). 
15 See §21 and §26 Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz; WpHG). 
16 See § L233-7 Trading Act (Code de commerce). 
17 See §20 Securities Exchange Act (Bundesgesetz über die Börsen und den Effektenhandel; BEHG). 
18 Selected sources are amongst others the leading news agencies Reuters and Dow Jones as well as Germany’s 
leading daily newspapers Bild Zeitung, Die Welt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Handelsblatt and Süddeutsche 
Zeitung. 
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calculate the financial ratios of the target and control companies via working through their corresponding 
annual reports.  
 
II.5. Analyses 
II.5.1. Characteristics of the Target Companies 
Table II.2. gives an overview of the different characteristics of Wyser-Pratte’s target companies, like the 
time of engagement by year, their security exchange or index and industry affiliation as well as Wyser-
Pratte’s shareholdings and his particular purpose of engagement. 
Table II.2. Characteristics of Wyser-Pratte's Target Companies between 2001–2011 
Due to the lack of an equivalent 13D U.S. SEC filing in Continental European 
jurisdictions, the data has been hand collected in a multi-source approach, i.e. via 
corresponding voting rights announcements, press coverage, Thomson Reuters, 
corporate websites. Panel A shows Wyser-Pratte’s engagement by year and the industry 
distribution based on the 4 digit SIC codes. Panel B tabulates the stock exchange or 
index affiliation and names of the target companies. Panel C presents average key 
financials of the group of target firms prior to Wyser-Pratte’s engagement, Panel D 
shows the purposes of each engagement stated by Wyser-Pratte. Panel E tabulates the 
combined size of Wyser-Pratte’s shareholdings and Panel F gives an overview of the 
way of approaching the target companies.   
    
 Panel A: Distribution of entry/engagement by year and 4 digit SIC1 industries 
 Year SIC1 industries  Number 
 2001 
Carburetors, pistons, rings, valve;  Radiotelephone 
Communications 
2 
 2002 Air Transportation, Scheduled; Turbines, turbine Generator Sets 2 
 2003 Machine Tools, metal Cutting Types  1 
 2005 Textile Machinery 1 
 2006 Railroad Equipment 1 
 2007 
Motor Vehicle Parts, accessories; Plastics Products, Nec; 
Photographic Equipment Supplies; Tour Operators; Skilled 
Nursing Care Facilities 
5 
 2010 Book Publishing 1 
 2011 Motor Vehicle Parts, accessories 1 
 Total   14 
  
 Panel B: Stock exchange or index listing and name of target firms 
 MDAX (Germany): Rheinmetall, Babcock Borsig, 
IWKA, Vossloh, Tognum 
  5 
 SDAX (Germany): Balda, Cewe Color, Curanum   3 
 DAX (Germany): TUI   1 
 NEMAX50 (Germany): Mobilcom   1 
 NYSE Euronext Paris (France): Lagardère, Valeo   2 
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 SMI Mid Cap Index (Switzerland): Unaxis   1 
 Vienna Stock Exchange (Austria): Austrian Airlines   1 
 Total   14 
 
Panel C: Key financials of target firms prior to Wyser-Pratte’s Engagement (n=14) 
 Mean Median 
∅ Net income (€m) -56.6  18.3 
∅ EBIT (€m) 3.4  24.6 
∅ EBITDA (€m) 252.9  125.4 
∅ Assets (€m) 4,350.6  3,050.4 
∅ Market Cap at year end (€m) 1,363.6  474 
 
 Panel D: Purpose of engagement according to quotes by Wyser-Pratte 
 Valuation    10 
 Business Strategy    7 
 Corporate Governance    6 
 Restructuring   3 
 Asset Sale   6 
 Block Merger/Higher Offer   2 
 
 Panel E: Size of block holding in target firms according to filings and/or 
quotes  
 Mean   4.38% 
 Median   5.01% 
 Minimum   0.53% 
 Maximum   8.8% 
 
 Panel F: Individual or partner engagement    
 Individual approach   7 
 With partners   1 
 Follower   6 
 
Panel A of Table II.2. shows a peak of his activities in the year 2007 and a differentiated industry focus. 
Based on the 4-digit SIC industry code, the 14 target companies are distributed across 13 different industries. 
The only industry which appears twice is the “Motor Vehicle Parts” sector. This suggests that Wyser-Pratte 
like other shareholder activists does not necessarily focus on specific industries but on other parameters. I 
will identify Wyser-Pratte’s rationales in the course of this study.  
Wyser-Pratte’s interest in mainly German mid-cap companies is indicated in Panel B and Panel C. 
More than half of the targets are part of Deutsche Börse’s most important mid and small cap stock indices, 
MDAX and SDAX. Other companies are part of equivalent indices of other major European stock 
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exchanges, like the French NYSE Euronext, the Austrian Vienna Stock Exchange and the SIX Swiss 
Exchange.  
Based on the lack of an 13D equivalent filing in Continental Europe, the purposes of the 
engagements as shown in Panel D are hand collected based on press statements by Wyser-Pratte or his 
affiliates. I used the categorization of Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010) and Greenwood and Schor (2009) as 
role models and adapted the 12 respectively 9 categories as follows: 
1. Valuation (identification of undervaluation; demanding increase of shareholder value towards 
boards) 
2. Business strategy (propose change of existing business strategy through focus on profitable 
businesses) 
3. Corporate Governance (criticize the track record, behavior and/or qualification of members of the 
Executive and/or Supervisory Board; trying to replace members) 
4. Restructuring (criticize the slow efforts in restructuring specific business parts) 
5. Asset Sale (demand the sale of specific business parts)  
6. Block Merger/Higher Offer (demand an increased offer price/valuation during offer periods) 
 
The distribution of the different categories perfectly shows the strategic approach of Wyser-Pratte when a 
company appeared on his radar screen. In most cases he criticised the undervaluation of the target 
accompanied by demanding a changed business strategy, i.e. focus on profitable business segments, and the 
sale of unprofitable segments. Compared to the approach of the legendary shareholder activist Carl Icahn 
who started most of his investments as passive investor (Venkiteshwaran et al. 2010), Wyser-Pratte followed 
a more aggressive approach. Some examples show that he publicly informed the target company’s 
management about his shareholding via press statements before the company received the official voting 
rights announcements.19 This approach is in line with the legal requirements but demonstrates the hostility 
of his investment style.  
Panel E reports the average size of his shareholdings in the target companies. Due to the lack of 
some voting rights announcements20, I also relied on the shareholding data mentioned by Wyser-Pratte or 
his affiliates via press statements. According to the data, the average shareholding in the target companies 
amounts to 4.38%, with a median of 5.01%. The highest shareholding he had during the analysis period was 
in the German KUKA AG (former IWKA AG) with 8.8%. With his shareholdings Wyser-Pratte is in line 
                                                          
19 See for example the press coverage with regard to the purchase of shares in Balda AG on 11 January 2007 or in 
CEWE Stiftung & Co. KGaA (former CEWE COLOR Holding AG) on 15 March 2007.  
20 For example, there is no need to declare a shareholding below the threshold of 3% in Germany; see §21 and §26 
Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz; WpHG).  
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with evidence presented by Katelouzou (2013) who finds average shareholdings of activist hedge funds in 
German companies of between 3.53% and 6.44%.21  
Finally, in Panel F I examine if Wyser-Pratte approached his target companies as first mover, 
follower or as part of a so called “wolf-pack” with other activist hedge funds. 50% of his engagements are 
based on an individual approach and in 43% of his investments he followed other activist investors. I identify 
just one case where Wyser-Pratte was part of an investment group who approached the French Valeo 
company. 
 
II.5.2. Key Performance Indicators of Target Companies prior to Engagement  
To analyse the operating and financial performance of the target companies prior the engagement by Wyser-
Pratte, I calculated some key performance indicators focusing on market valuation, profitability, leverage, 
cash and capital expenditures (see also definitions in Table II.3.).  
 
Table II.3. Definitions of selected Key Performance Indicators 
All data have been hand collected from the corresponding financial section of the annual reports 
of the target and control companies. I used the reports of each financial year prior to the 
engagement by Wyser-Pratte as well as both reports of the two years following the activist event. 
Beside the ordinary financial ratios, I conducted the remaining ratios as follows: 
 
Key Performance Indicators Definition 
Capex / Assets = Sum of investments in tangible and intangible assets / Assets 
Cash / Assets = Cash at year end / Assets 
Dividend Payout Ratio = Dividends paid / Net income 
Market to Book Value = Market capitalization at year end / Equity 
ROA = Net income / Assets 
ROE = Net income / Equity 
Total Asset Turnover = Sales / Assets 
 
Table II.4. shows these indicators of the respective financial year prior to the year of engagement and 
compares the figures to those of my control group. 
                                                          
21 3.53% average minimum and 6.44% average maximum shareholdings.   
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Table II.4. Definitions of selected Key Performance Indicators 
This table shows various financial performance indicators to characterize Wyser-Pratte’s 
target companies compared to the control group. The indicators are based on the companies’ 
annual reports of the financial year prior to the engagement. For the definition of the data, 
please see Table II.3. The different columns show the number of observations, the means and 
medians of each variable as well as the corresponding test statistics. I conducted the t-Test 
for the difference in mean and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-Test for the difference in 
median between the target companies and the control group. ***, **, * and # indicate 
significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
       
    
Wyser-Pratte 
Sample 
Control Sample 
t-Test (Z-Test) 
for difference in 
means (medians) 
Key figures   Obs.    Obs.      
Pre 1 year BHAR mean 14 -0.213 17 -0.015 -1.911# 
  median   -0.295   -0.034 2.342* 
ROA mean 14 -0.009 17 0.037 -2.297* 
  median   0.015   0.028 1.469 
ROE mean 14 -0.016 17 0.088 -1.800# 
  median   0.056   0.097 1.429 
Pretax Income / Assets mean 14 0.000 17 0.060 -2.279* 
  median   0.026   0.040 1.548 
EBIT / Sales mean 14 0.001 17 0.066 -2.265* 
  median   0.029   0.029 1.270 
EBITDA / Assets mean 14 0.077 17 0.109 -1.364 
  median   0.084   0.094 1.350 
Total Asset Turnover mean 14 1.026 17 1.156 -0.653 
  median   0.956   0.994 0.079 
Dividend payout ratio mean 14 0.345 17 -0.427 0.709 
  median   0.308   0.330 0.161 
Capex / Assets mean 14 -0.112 17 -0.042 -1.285 
  median   -0.046   -0.024 1.310 
Cash / Assets mean 14 0.079 17 0.121 -1.376 
  median   0.064   0.080 0.754 
Interest-bearing Debt / 
Equity 
mean 14 1.191 17 1.021 0.406 
  median   0.942   0.492 -0.714 
Interest-bearing Debt / Assets mean 14 0.265 17 0.191 1.280 
  median   0.246   0.147 -1.389 
Market to Book Value mean 14 1.607 17 2.911 -1.613 
  median   1.330   2.017 2.143* 
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The shares of the target companies underperform the control group with a mean (median) return of -21%  
(-30%) compared to -1% (-3%). The differences between both the medians and means are statistically 
significant. I also identify a statistically significant underperformance with regard to the means of most of 
the profitability indicators, like return on assets, return on equity, pre-tax income to assets and the operating 
margin (EBIT to sales). The differences of the market to book value medians are also statistically significant. 
Overall it can be stated that the target companies of Wyser-Pratte are less profitable, have less cash (cash to 
assets ratio), higher leverage (debt to equity and debt to assets ratios) and lower valued (market to book 
value) than the companies of the control group. 
 
In addition to the analysis above and to predict if a company could probably fit into Wyser-Pratte’s target 
scheme based on specific performance indicators, I conducted a binomial logistic regression with selected 
indicators.22 The results are reported in Table II.5. 
 
Table II.5. Definitions of selected Key Performance Indicators 
This table reports the results of the binomial logistic 
regression to predict the probability that a company 
could become a target of Wyser-Pratte. The column 
shows a set of selected key performance indicators 
(see also Table II.3.) which consists of the target 
companies and the control group. ***, **, * and # 
indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels. 
Constant -0.293 
Pre 1 year BHAR -1.817 
ROE -3.007 
Dividend payout ratio 0.160 
Cash / Assets -3.509 
Interest-bearing Debt / Assets 1.517 
    
Obs. 31 
Likelihood Ratio 35.43 
Hosmer Lemeshow-Test 0.168 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerkes Rsq) 0.279 
 
                                                          
22 Logistic regression tests with all or a large selection of the presented performance indicators in Table II.4. suggested 
a very high correlation between the figures. So, I decided to limit the indicators to the most relevant.  
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As independent variables I test the one-financial-year pre-investment buy and hold abnormal return, return 
on equity, dividend payout ratio, cash holdings (cash to assets) and leverage (debt to assets). Despite an 
adequate quality of the model (see p-value of Hosmer Lemeshow-Test of above 0.05), the results of the 
regression are not statistically significant.  
A careful interpretation of the results comes to the conclusion that there is an increased likelihood 
of becoming a Wyser-Pratte target if the specific company shows an unsatisfying stock price performance 
and operates less profitable as well as has low cash holdings and a high leverage. This analysis is in line 
with the findings concerning the target firm characteristics mentioned above (and as reported in Table II.4.). 
But one unexpected finding is the relation between the cash holding and the leverage which is contrary to 
most research. Numerous recent studies assign activist shareholders a strict focus on corporate capital 
structures which are not beneficial for shareholders, i.e. low payout ratio, high cash holdings and low 
leverage (see for example the statements on target firm characteristics of (Boyson and Mooradian, 2012), 
(Brav et al., 2009), (Cziraki et al., 2010)). According to my analysis, Wyser-Pratte seems to pay more 
attention to undermanaged and undervalued companies. 
 
II.5.3. Market Reactions in the Course of Wyser-Pratte’s Target Company Entries 
To analyse the corresponding market reactions in the course of the public announcements of the 
engagements of Wyser-Pratte, I conducted short-term event studies focusing on three different event 
windows. If the specific entry date was missing due to the lack of filing data, I defined the day of the first 
public announcement, e.g. via press statements, of the investment as event day (t=0). I used a standard 
market model to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as well as the mean cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAAR).23 
 
Table II.6. Short Run Event Studies surrounding the Specific Engagement Date 
This table shows the results of the short-term event studies across different time 
windows. I used the standard market model with the Stoxx Europe 600 as 
benchmark index. Panel A includes all target companies, Panel B one delisted 
company, Panel C acquired companies and Panel D survived companies. Each 
panel contains the mean cumulative abnormal return (CAAR), the statistic values 
of the t-Test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank-Test and the number of positive versus 
negative returns.  ***, **, * and # indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 
10% levels. 
       
                                                          
23 My standard market model is based on an estimation window of more than 250 trading days ending 10 days prior 
to the event day (t=0). My benchmark index was the Stoxx Europe 600 representing 600 large, medium and small 
public listed European companies. With the parameters calculated via the estimation window, I was able to compute 
the expected, abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the different event windows. The abnormal return is 
the difference between the target company’s return and the expected return.  
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Panel A: All Wyser-Pratte 
Targets N=14 
Event windows in days 
  [-1,+1] [-10,+10] [-10,+30] 
CAAR       9.37% 11.48% 13.30% 
t-value       4.41*** 2.45* 2.60* 
Z-score       3.045** 1.977* 2.166* 
P/N       12/2 11/3 10/4 
       
Panel B: Delisted Targets N=1   
CAAR       23.08% 34.70% 25.58% 
t-value        -   -   -  
Z-score        -   -   -  
P/N       1/0 1/0 1/0 
       
Panel C: Acquired Targets (N=3)   
CAAR       3.01% 1.69% 3.60% 
t-value       0.916 0.140 0.295 
Z-score       0.535 0.000 0.000 
P/N       2/1 1/2 ½ 
       
Panel D: Survived Targets (N=10)   
CAAR       9.88% 12.10% 14.98% 
t-value       4.447** 2.403* 2.434* 
Z-score       2.701** 2.090* 2.191* 
P/N       9/1 9/1 8/2 
 
As presented in Panel A of Table II.6., I find significant abnormal returns for all target companies and across 
all three event windows: 9.4% (for the three-day event window), 11.5% (21-day event window) and 13.3% 
(for the 41-day event window). According to the analysis of Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010), I divided the 
group of target companies into three subgroups and calculated the abnormal returns again, i.e. in companies 
which were delisted within 18 months following Wyser-Pratte’s investment, acquired companies and 
companies which survived more than 18 months.  
My findings show the highest positive abnormal returns for the only one delisted company24 (34.7% 
for the 21-day event window), the lowest abnormal returns for the three acquired companies (1.7% for the 
21-day event window) and – compared with the results of Panel A – higher abnormal returns for the ten 
surviving companies of between 9.9% to 15%. The results are therefore in line with the results of 
Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010) concerning the announcement market returns for Carl Icahn as well as with 
                                                          
24 The company was the German industrial conglomerate Babcock Borsig AG. The company announced on 7 
January 2002 that Wyser-Pratte purchased around 5.01% of the company’s shares. Babcock Borsig filed for 
insolvency on 4 July 2002.   
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the positive results of other studies on shareholder activism in Germany.25 But my results should be handled 
with care due to the limited size of the sample group and the fact that only the results of Panel A (all 
companies) and Panel D (surviving companies) are significant.26 
 
II.5.4. Changes in Medium Term Financial and Operating Performance 
As there are still different opinions regarding the medium- and respectively long-term effects of shareholder 
activism on target companies, I also conducted an analysis to determine either positive or negative long term 
changes of the companies’ financial and operating performance. Therefore, I focused my analysis on those 
target companies that survived (i.e. remained independent) the investment entry of Wyser-Pratte for at least 
18 months.  
The analysis is based on the same key financial indicators as described in Table II.4. and comprises 
two different time windows. The first time window shows the changes from the last financial year prior to 
the investment of Wyser-Pratte [t=-1] to the first financial year following his investment [t=+1]. The second 
time window contains the changes from the first financial year [t=+1] to the second financial year [t=+2] 
following the investment. 
 
Table II.7. Changes in Target Firm's Financial and Operating Performance 
This table presents changes of various financial performance indicators (see also Table II.3.) 
of the target companies and the control samples. It contains companies that are not delisted or 
acquired within 18 months following the engagement by Wyser-Pratte. The first time window 
([t-1] – [t+1]) shows changes from the financial year prior to the engagement to the first 
financial year following the engagement. The second time window ([t+1] – [t+2]) reports the 
changes from the first year to the second year following Wyser-Pratte’s engagement. The 
columns ∆X and ∆Y show the mean difference of each variable for both sample groups across 
the two time windows. The last column presents the difference in means, i.e. between the row 
∆X and ∆Y. ***, **, * and # indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
    
Wyser-
Pratte 
Sample 
Control 
Sample 
Difference in 
Mean 
Key figures Period N ∆X N ∆Y H0:∆ = 0 
∆ROA [t-1] – [t+1] 12 -0.0225 15 -0.0070 -0.0155 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.0777 15 -0.0030 0.0807 
       
∆ROE [t-1] – [t+1] 12 -0.8423 15 -0.0328 -0.8095 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.9183 15 -0.0222 0.9405 
       
                                                          
25 See for example Bessler and Holler (2008) with CARs of 1% [-1,+1] to 3.5% [-15,+15], Drerup (2011) with CARs of 
1.22% [-1,+1] to 3.47% [-20,+20] and Stadler (2010) with CARs of 3.27% [-2,+2] to 8.75% [-20,+20]. 
26 As expected, the significance of the used statistic tests highly depends on the respective sample size which is 
demonstrated by my results as well. 
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∆Pretax Income / Assets [t-1] – [t+1] 12 -0.0204 15 -0.0106 -0.0098 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.0786 15 -0.0056 0.0842 
       
∆EBIT / Sales [t-1] – [t+1] 12 -0.0948 15 -0.0125 -0.0822 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.1465 15 -0.0033 0.1498 
       
∆EBITDA / Assets [t-1] – [t+1] 12 0.0816 15 -0.0020 0.0836 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 -0.0480 15 -0.0046 -0.0434 
       
∆Total Asset Turnover [t-1] – [t+1] 12 -0.0547 15 0.1006 -0.1553 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.1187 15 -0.0574 0.1761 
       
∆Dividend payout ratio [t-1] – [t+1] 12 -0.1876 15 0.7504 -0.9381 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.1619 15 4.2190 -4.0570 
       
∆Capex / Assets [t-1] – [t+1] 12 0.0645 15 0.0137 0.0508 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.0134 15 0.0043 0.0091 
       
∆Cash / Assets [t-1] – [t+1] 12 -0.0034 15 0.0095 -0.0129 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.0423 15 0.0023 0.0400 
       
∆Interest-bearing Debt / Equity [t-1] – [t+1] 12 1.6238 15 -0.1763 1.8001 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 -1.9067 15 -0.0286 -1.8781 
       
∆Interest-bearing Debt / Assets [t-1] – [t+1] 12 0.0305 15 -0.0003 0.0308 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 -0.0919 15 -0.0117 -0.0803 
       
∆Market to Book Value [t-1] – [t+1] 12 -0.1610 15 -1.2600 1.0990 
  [t+1] – [t+2] 12 0.1967 15 0.0621 0.1347 
 
As reported in Table II.7., I do not find any statistical significant difference between the target companies 
and the control group over the two time windows; the limited sample size can be one reason.27 Apart from 
that the analysis shows some important insights. It can be stated that nearly all profitability indicators of the 
target companies worsen in the first time window and improve in the second time window compared to the 
control group. With focus on the target companies only, the dividend payout ratio shows the same 
development, i.e. decrease in the first time window and increase in the second. But compared to the control 
companies, the ratio still lags behind. After decreasing in the first time window, the detected cash holdings 
improve during the second time period and reach a higher level than the control companies. The leverage 
shows an opposite development with relative lower debt holdings at the end of the second financial year 
[t=+2].  
                                                          
27 I also adapted the control group with regard to surviving companies and therefore excluded two companies.  
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Summarising the qualitative results carefully, Wyser-Pratte’s targets become better performing 
companies at the end of the second year following the activist approach. The higher profitability goes in 
line with an increased cash flow which is reflected in a higher dividend payout ratio as well as higher cash 
holdings. Additionally, the target companies take actions to lower their leverage.  
In addition to the analysis of the medium-term financial and operating performance, I looked into 
the share price performance of the target companies starting one month prior Wyser-Pratte’s investment  
[t=-1] until 18 months after the initial filing [t=+18].28 
 
 
Table II.8. Long-Term Post Performance 
This table reports the long-term post performance 
of the target companies’ shares. I used the Stoxx 
Europe 600 as benchmark index. The time window 
consists of one month prior to the engagement date 
to 18 months following the engagement [-1,+18]. 
The columns contain all target companies as well 
as the acquired and survived companies. For each 
group, I present the number of companies, the mean 
abnormal buy hold return, the statistic values of the 
t-Test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank-Test and the 
number of positive versus negative returns. ***, **, 
* and # indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels.  
          
Market Model mean Buy Hold Abnormal Returns 
(BHAR) for all Targets over 19 Months [-1,+18] 
  
All Targets 
Acquired 
Targets 
Survived 
Targets   
N   14 3 10 
BHAR   6.24% 0.07% 15.51% 
t-value   0.402 0.004 0.780 
Z-score   -0.408 0.000 -0.153 
P/N   7/7 2/1 5/5 
 
 
 
                                                          
28 Like my short term event studies, I divided the analysis into three different subgroups and calculated the Buy Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHAR) and mean Buy Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAAR) for all target companies, the three 
acquired companies and the ten surviving companies. To calculate the returns, I used the Stoxx Europe 600 index as 
benchmark again.  
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Figure II.1. Buy Hold Abnormal Returns (BHAR) for survived Targets (n=10) over 19 Months [-1,+18] 
 
 
 
As Table II.8. shows, the returns are not statistically significant for all groups but in line with the results of 
my short term event studies. All target companies show mean BHAR of 6.2%, the acquired companies have 
the worst mean BHAR (0.07%) and the surviving companies perform best with 15.5% mean BHAR. Figure 
II.1. shows the distribution of the BHAR of the survived target firms with a range from  
-52,3% to 148,2%. Additionally, the figures illustrates that half of the survived target companies have 
negative BHAR only and that the positive mean BHAR mainly depends on two surviving firms with very 
high BHAR.  
 
II.5.5. Success Rate of Wyser-Pratte’s Activism  
Beside financial and operating improvements as well as outperforming share prices, a closer look on the 
more qualitative outcome of Wyser-Pratte’s active engagements offers additional insights. I compared his 
demands which he publicly made in the course of each company engagement with the actual outcome of 
each case up to two years following his investment. Based on the categories I presented in Panel D of Table 
II.2., I run a Factiva search for each target company and focused on articles which gave evidence concerning 
the fulfilment of the stated demands. 
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Table II.9. Success Rate of Wyser-Pratte's Activism by Outcome 
This table presents the success rate with regard to the stated purposes by Wyser-Pratte in the course 
of each company engagement. The success rate consists of the achieved, failed and indefinite 
outcome in relation to all stated purposes. Panel A shows the success rate for all target companies 
and Panel B reports the success rate for the target companies that survived the engagement by at 
least 18 months.  
 
Panel A: Success Rate of Wyser-Pratte's Activism with 
All Firms 
        
Publicly stated purpose tabulation across all activist 
engagements  
# 
Total 
# 
Achieved 
#  
Failed 
# 
Indeterminate 
Valuation          10 2 5 3 
Business Strategy          7 2 4 1 
Corporate Governance          6 1 4 1 
Remind restructuring         3 0 2 1 
Asset Sale         6 2 3 1 
Block merger/higher offer         2 1 1 0 
Total         34 8 19 7 
% of Objectives Met/Failed/Indeterminate       23.53% 55.88% 20.59% 
                  
Panel B: Success Rate of Wyser-Pratte's Activism with Survived 
Firms 
      
Publicly stated purpose tabulation across all activist 
engagements  
# 
Total 
# 
Achieved 
#  
Failed 
# 
Indeterminate 
Valuation          6 1 3 2 
Business Strategy          5 2 2 1 
Corporate Governance          5 1 3 1 
Remind restructuring         3 0 2 1 
Asset Sale         6 2 3 1 
Block merger/higher offer         0 0 0 0 
Total         25 6 13 6 
% of Objectives Met/Failed/Indeterminate       24.00% 52.00% 24.00% 
 
As reported in Table II.9., the frequency analysis shows an overall success rate of 23.5% and a failure rate 
of 55.9%. Wyser-Pratte was especially successful with regard to increase the target companies’ valuation, 
to change their business strategy and to force asset sales. On the other side, he failed with most of these 
objectives, especially with the several times stated objective to remove members of the supervisory and/or 
executive board. The findings do not change much if I focus the analysis on target companies which remain 
independent for more than 18 months following the engagement. The success rate stays nearly the same 
(24%) and the failure rate only slightly decreases (52%). The high amount of failed attempts to force 
personnel changes (see category “Corporate Governance”) in the managing and/or supervisory boards of 
the targets firms can be an indication for the distinctive characteristic of the Continental European corporate 
environment and its difficulty for minority investors to exert influence as well as for the activist’s strategy 
37 
 
 
to use this angle to put pressure on the target firms as a whole in the knowledge that this specific approach 
will fail in most instances.   
 
II.6. Comparison of my Results with relevant Research 
This study examines the investment activities of a single activist investor with key focus on Continental 
Europe for the first time. Key differentiator of my results to existing, mainly Anglo-Saxon based, research 
is the focus of Wyser-Pratte on improving the profitability of his target companies instead of changing their 
capital structure. This assumption is based on my findings concerning cash holding, dividend payout ratio 
and leverage which are contrary to other major studies like for example from Boyson and Mooradian (2007), 
Brav et al. (2009), Clifford (2008) or Klein and Zur (2006). These studies report effects like cash reductions 
through higher dividend payments and an increased leverage which proof the positive effect of shareholder 
activism on agency conflicts and shareholder value.29 But the analysis of Wyser-Pratte’s target companies 
shows increased cash holdings accompanied by a slightly higher dividend payout ratio30 and decreased 
leverage. This approach can be interpreted as an indicator that value generation by shareholder activism 
works different in the institutional setting of Continental Europe which can probably take more time but 
will lead to better performing companies with stable cash flows and capital structures to increase both the 
cash holdings for further investments and the dividend payout. This approach is in line with the detected 
target firm characteristics31 (see Table II.4.) as well as with the study of Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) 
who state that “hedge funds (…) are not able to enhance shareholder value by reducing agency costs” in 
Germany.  
 Other results of my study do not differ much from existing research. Equivalent to activist investors 
in Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions, Wyser-Pratte focuses his investment activities on poor performing companies 
(compare for example with (Bebchuk et al., 2015), (Bethel et al., 1998), (Drerup, 2011), (Gillan and Starks, 
1998), (Karpoff, 2001)). The short- and long-term share price reactions do also not differ from other studies. 
I determine for example abnormal returns of 9.4% for a three-day and 6.2% for an 19-months event 
window32 which provide clear evidence for the shareholder value enhancing effect of Wyser-Pratte’s 
activism.  
Looking at Wyser-Pratte’s success respectively failure rate of 23.5% and 55.9% in enforcing his 
demands towards the target companies’ boards, my findings indicate that he demands the same topics as 
                                                          
29 See Jensen (1986) who mentioned that cash payouts to shareholders could reduce potential agency conflicts.  
30 But the ratio still underperforms the control companies.  
31 Higher likelihood to become a target company with a low cash level and high leverage.  
32 For comparison see for example Becht et al. (2010a) with 11.4% long term abnormal returns, Boyson and 
Mooradian (2007) with mean CAR of 8.13% in a 51-days event window, Akhigbe et al. (1997) with CAR of 9.27% at 
the end of the first year following an activist event.   
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other activists33 but is less successful compared to the results of the mainly Anglo-Saxon focused studies.34 
One comprehensible reason for the low success rate could be the distinctive characteristic of the German – 
or in the broadest sense Continental European – corporate environment especially compared to Anglo-Saxon 
jurisdictions.35 The German corporate environment consists of a vast amount of small and medium sized 
public listed companies often owned and/or controlled by their founding families as well as headed by 
frequently co-determined supervisory boards. Despite the renunciation of the so-called “Deutschland AG” 
during the past decade, this special model of ownership and control still limits the influence or activities of 
minority shareholders like activist hedge funds in Germany ((Bessler and Holler, 2008), (La Porta et al., 
2000), (Schaefer and Hertrich, 2013), (Thamm, 2013)).36  
Finally, I separately compare my major findings with the few existing research on single activist 
investors. Smith (1996) investigates the investment approach of CalPERS, the California Public Employees' 
Retirement System, and identifies firm size, i.e. market value of equity, and the level of institutional 
shareholders as key criteria of becoming an CalPERS target. Becht et al. (2010b) who analyse the activities 
of the Hermes UK Focus Fund find poor share price performance as being the decisive target characteristic 
which is generally in line with my study outcome. U.S. activist investor Carl Icahn, analysed by 
Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010), focuses his engagements on companies with higher leverage and lower 
dividend payout ratios which partially applies to my results as well.  
With positive short- and long-term share price reactions I demonstrate the value enhancing effects 
of the shareholder activism by Wyser-Pratte. Smith (1996) mentions that the value effects depend on the 
outcome of the engagement by CalPERS. Successful activism especially with regard to changes of the 
governance structures leads to an increase in shareholder wealth.37 Smythe et al. (2015) examine the basis 
for the value enhancing activism of CalPERS and find significant positive value effects based on the targets’ 
                                                          
33 See for example Bratton (2007): asset sale or spin-off, change of corporate strategy and increase cash payout or 
Pearson and Altman (2006): asset sale, increase dividend, share buyback, board representation and changes of 
corporate governance structures.  
34 See for example Boyson and Mooradian (2007): 70% success rate to get a board representation; Brav et al. (2008): 
overall success rate of around 66%; Girard (2009): overall success rate of 45%; Klein and Zur (2006): overall success 
rate of 60%; Kühne (2011): rate of at least partial success of 53%.  
35 See Katelouzou (2013) who mentions that “there is some evidence that the legal environment has an impact on 
the incidence and magnitude of global hedge fund activism”.  
36 The influence of the different corporate environment in Germany (and in Continental Europe) is supported by the 
fact that Wyser-Pratte holds only below average shareholdings in his target companies which limits his power to 
enforce his demands towards the management (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). His average shareholding of 4.38% is 
absolutely in line with the findings of Katelouzou (2013) who determines a range of average minimum and maximum 
shareholdings of activist hedge funds in Germany of between 3.53% and 6.44% but it is significantly below the range 
of all analyzed countries (of between 6.10% and 11.54%).  
37 Two-day event window with mean CAR of +1.06% for sample firms that adopt CalPERS's shareholder resolutions 
or execute CalPERS initiated governance changes.  
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poor prior stock performance and the smaller firm size.38 Restructuring activities and top executive changes 
initiated by Hermes also generate large excess returns.39 And Venkiteshwaran et al. (2010) find value 
enhancing market reactions based on Icahn’s activities as well.40  
 
II.7. Conclusion 
The first study examining the investment activities of a single activist investor in Continental Europe shows 
that a shareholder activist could also successfully execute his investment strategy in a corporate environment 
which is quite different from Anglo-Saxon jurisdictions. My study provides a new insight according to 
which Wyser-Pratte focuses his investment activities on improving the profitability of his target companies. 
This can be interpreted as an indicator that value generation by shareholder activism works different in the 
institutional setting of Continental Europe which will probably take more time but could lead to better 
performing companies and higher returns for the shareholder activists in the long run. This approach is in 
stark contrast to the common focus of shareholder activists on short-term capital structure adjustments and 
therefore differentiates my study from recent mainly Anglo-Saxon based research.  
  
                                                          
38 The results of the OLS regression of Smythe et al. (2015) show a significant negative correlation between the 
dependent variable CAR – which is the abnormal estimated return of firms targeted by CalPERS and computed over 
a 3 day event window [-1,+1] – and the targets prior stock performance (the industry adjusted buy and hold return 
for the 5 years prior to targeting) and the firm size (the inflation adjusted log of the target’s book value of assets).  
39 11-day event window with mean CAR of +6.66% as largest excess return triggered by restructuring activities, 
including sales of assets and divisions; 7-day event window with mean CAR of +6.09% triggered by changes of CEO 
and chairmen; events with confounding information are excluded. 
40 Range from three-day event window with mean CAR of +6.93% to 41-day event window with mean CAR of +16.6%.  
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III. Shareholder Activism by Family Business Investors: The Clinical Study 
of German KUKA AG 
 
Summary 
This study should close the research gap concerning the potential different proceedings of family business 
investors and Anglo-Saxon style investors. Therefore, I analyse the confrontation between the German 
machine manufacturer KUKA, U.S. shareholder activist Wyser-Pratte and the German family company 
Grenzebach between 2003 and 2011. The analysis shows that both investors are successful in getting the 
boards to acquiesce to their demands which lead to massive divestures, an improved profitability, the three 
times replacement of KUKA’s CEO and different changes of the supervisory board composition. However, 
the analysis of the stock returns shows deterioration for both investors. 
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III.1. Introduction 
Compared to the United States, shareholder activism is a relatively new phenomenon in corporate Germany 
which first appeared at the beginning of the new millennium in the course of the Mannesmann/Vodafone 
takeover battle. Due to a different corporate governance system, a high level of cross-shareholdings within 
the corporate environment and the frequent appearance of family business investors as active investors, 
German shareholder activism cases partially differ from typical cases in other jurisdictions, like the United 
States or the United Kingdom.  
Maybe the most prominent case which perfectly suits for the analysis of a confrontation with a 
classical shareholder activist and the active engagement of a typical German family business investor is 
KUKA AG (“KUKA”). The German mid-cap machine manufacturer KUKA - which was renamed in 2007 
from IWKA AG41 - became the investment target of the well-known U.S. hedge fund activist Wyser-Pratte 
in 2003 and the family owned plant engineering company Grenzebach Maschinenbau GmbH 
(“Grenzebach”) in 2008. Following his share purchase, Wyser-Pratte primarily forced the KUKA 
management to break-up the company’s conglomerate structure. Grenzebach on the other side acquired 
step-by-step a blocking minority stake in KUKA and demanded for an adequate board representation and 
business expansion. In December 2014, it became public that Grenzebach sold all shares in KUKA to the 
Voith Group, another German family owned engineering company. Wyser-Pratte left the supervisory board 
of KUKA in June 2015. It is not clear if he still holds shares in KUKA as his last holdings were below the 
notifiable threshold level of 3%. 
The detailed analysis of KUKA prior, during and following the activism process and a comparison 
of these results with peers and large sample studies give evidence about the success and the impact of 
shareholder activism on the target company. Furthermore, the clinical study highlights the specific role of 
family business investors in Germany as activist shareholders and helps to subsume this specific German 
case into the broader context of shareholder activism. 
 
This study is structured as follows. Paragraph 2 informs about the origins and key players of shareholder 
activism. Paragraph 3 reviews the current research. Paragraph 4 gives additional background information 
about KUKA, Wyser-Pratte and Grenzebach as well as highlights the major events of the whole 
confrontation between the years 2003 and 2011. Paragraph 5 reviews the study’s methodology and data 
collection. Paragraph 6 presents the results of the analysis and paragraph 7 concludes the study. 
 
                                                          
41 For the sake of convenience and due to the renaming in 2007, I name the company KUKA.  
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III.2. The Origins of Shareholder Activism and its Current Major 
Representatives 
Shareholder activism is today perceived as the effort of different investors, for example hedge funds, private 
equity firms, pension funds, mutual funds, or individual investors, to increase their return via actively 
influencing the target company’s management and supervisory board as well as its corporate governance 
structure (see for example Schwartzman and Snyder, 2007).  
This understanding of shareholder activism is mainly rooted in the social rights movements in the 
U.S. during the 1940s to 1960s ((Thompson and Davis, 1997), (Vogel, 1983)) where more and more 
shareholders, especially individual investors, became interested in the monitoring of social, economic and 
governance issues focusing on the companies they invested in. In the 1980s, other investor groups entered 
the stage as active investors, like corporate raiders, pension funds, insurance companies, labour unions or 
strategic investors (Brav et al., 2008). These shareholder groups became active when they were for example 
dissatisfied with the performance of the company or its board of directors or when the company’s 
governance structure limited a sufficient control of the management.  
The elimination or at least limitation of these agency conflicts have been the main rationale for 
shareholder activism within the last decades. The tool of active involvement helps to restrict the 
management’s possibilities to act in their own interest but is unequally executed by different shareholders 
((Jensen and Meckling, 1976), (Gillan and Starks, 1998), (Nordén and Strand, 2011)). The landscape of 
shareholder activism advanced in the 1990s due to changed regulations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC). Shareholders were now allowed to communicate more flexible, get access to corporate 
shareholder lists and vote more easily for individual board members (Akhigbe et al., 1997). Due to additional 
regulative changes, as new diversification requirements, insider trading regulations and conflict of interest 
guidelines, institutional investors engaged themselves in fewer activist cases (Brav et al., 2008).  
According to the changed regulations for mutual and investment funds, fund managers started to 
look for profitable alternative investment vehicles. These developments in combination with overall 
decreased financial transaction, research, communication and leverage costs, benefited the whole alternative 
investment sector, especially the hedge fund and private equity industry (Cheffins and Armour, 2011). As 
Gillan and Starks (2007) mentioned, these fund types have become increasingly important players in 
financial markets, particularly in their capacity as monitors of corporate performance and agents of change. 
The investment philosophy of active hedge funds and private equity funds is in most instances determined 
to influence the target company, its management and corporate governance in the shareholders’ interest 
(Mietzner et al., 2011). The corresponding compensation of the fund managers is in both cases mainly based 
on the funds’ performance (Achleitner et al., 2010).  
Hedge funds differ from private equity funds in some points. They employ various investment 
strategies (see for example Rozwadowski and Young, 2005), have their own capital at stake and are using 
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additional financial instruments to improve their returns or limit their losses, like derivatives and short 
selling positions. Generally, the funds invest only limited amount of money to acquire minority stakes 
(normally 5% at the most) in the targeted publicly listed company. In contrast, the main investment activities 
of private equity funds are the provision of early stage venture capital and equity capital for buyouts (Wright 
et al., 2009). Therefore, private equity funds typically target private companies or they invest into publicly 
listed firms to take them private afterwards (Subiotto, 2006). According to their business model, private 
equity funds acquire major stakes or become principal shareholder in basically strong companies to achieve 
an adequate supervisory board representation and influence the corporate strategy in their sense, for example 
via restructuring measures. Due to their large invested amount of money, a profitable exit strategy is very 
important for private equity funds ((Schwartzman and Snyder, 2007), (Thomas and Young, 2006)).  
According to the specifics presented above, it is comprehensible that most activist cases as well as 
the corresponding large sample studies are associated with hedge funds initiated activism. Activist hedge 
funds benefit from a shorter investment horizon, the use of various financial instruments and less invested 
capital. But as this clinical study shows shareholder activism could also be initiated by other investor groups 
like for example family business investors. Compared to activist hedge funds, these investors who became 
more active in Germany over the last couple of years invest higher amounts of money to acquire major 
stakes in the target companies and strive for adequate board representations to exert their dominating 
influence. With their specific cultural backgrounds, it is still an open question whether traditional German 
family business investors and Anglo-Saxon style financial sponsors behave differently.  
I address this research gap and examine the potential different proceedings of both investor types 
(activist hedge fund vs. family business investor) as well as the impact of their actions on the target company 
in the course of a shareholder activism process. The situation of KUKA perfectly suits for this kind of 
analysis. 
 
III.3. Review of Literature and Key Findings on Shareholder Activism 
Numerous mainly U.S. studies analyse the key characteristics of companies which have been targeted by 
activist shareholders. Gillan and Starks (1998) identify poor operational performance as key criterion. 
Bethel et al. (1998) and Drerup (2011) find a significant lower return on assets (ROA) and return on equity 
(ROE) prior to an activist event compared to firms that do not experience such an approach. Judge et al. 
(2010) show that the lower the firm’s prior profitability the higher is the possibility to become a target of 
financial activism. Target firms are much more diversified and have lower expected sales growth rates (Brav 
et al., 2009). Beside operational factors, the financial structure also gives some evidence if a company will 
be targeted by activist shareholders. Target companies may have a low level of debt ((Cziraki et al., 2010), 
(Ellison et al., 2008)) or do not hold large amounts of cash (Drerup, 2011). However, the last finding 
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conflicts with the results of Ellison et al. (2008) who mentioned that target companies possess high amounts 
of cash. Further studies also contradict some of the deliverables just mentioned. Klein and Zur (2006, 2009) 
find that activist hedge funds are focusing on profitable and financially healthy companies with liquidity 
above average. According to Boyson and Mooradian (2007), a typical target of activist shareholders is a 
cash cow with poor growth prospects but a high ROA. And Nordén and Strand (2011) state that activist 
shareholders are focusing less on poor performing companies but on large firms with high media exposure 
to use the Annual General Meeting (AGM) as proper platform for the involved fund managers or investment 
company.  
Similar to the assertions regarding the target firm characteristics, there are also contrary results 
concerning the effectiveness of shareholder activism and the impact on the target firms. Oded and Wang 
(2010) doubt the general value enhancing effects of activism. Nevertheless various large U.S. and European 
sample studies show a value enhancing effect of shareholder activism, especially as positive abnormal share 
price reactions following the public filing of a share purchase by an activist shareholder (see for example 
(Akhigbe et al., 1997), (Becht et al., 2010a), (Klein and Zur, 2009), (Clifford, 2008), (Boyson and 
Mooradian, 2007), (Brav et al., 2009), (Mietzner and Schweizer, 2014), (Bessler and Holler, 2008)). The 
value effects are higher if the activism is initiated by an individual shareholder or a group of shareholders 
(Akhigbe et al., 1997), or an activist fund which is well-known (Bessler and Holler, 2008), or has a track 
record of successful engagements (Brav et al., 2008), and if it concerns a public rather than private activism 
(Becht et al., 2010a).  
Some studies also show long-term positive value effects which appear several months or even years 
following the activism event. These positive abnormal stock market returns could be similar or even higher 
than the short-term value effects (see for example (Akhigbe et al., 1997), (Brav et al., 2009), (Klein and Zur, 
2009), (Bessler and Holler, 2008)). But Weber and Zimmermann (2013) relativize these observations as 
they noted that the positive abnormal stock market effects are only part of price reactions surrounding the 
activist announcement event. Major parts of the value increases are based on transactional effects like insider 
trading by the activists in the forerun of the transactions.  
Other large sample studies give evidence that shareholder activism does not lead to positive long-
term share price effects too. Drerup (2011) just finds returns that are market neutral but without value 
destructive effects on the firm value. Mietzner and Schweizer (2014) show negative long-term buy-and-
hold abnormal returns which could be based on the assumption that market participants do not believe in 
the value enhancing abilities of activist hedge funds compared to private equity firms. Additionally, Karpoff 
(2001) does not find significant positive long-term abnormal returns as well.  
The assessment of the impact of shareholder activism on target companies does not give definite 
results as well. Beside positive abnormal stock market returns following an activist event, an improvement 
of the target firms’ operating performance through ROA is discovered by Clifford (2008), Bethel et al. 
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(1998) and Boyson and Mooradian (2007). This performance improvement is mainly driven by the divesture 
of under-performing assets. This observation is in line with additional findings of Bethel et al. (1998) who 
show on the one hand an increase of asset divestures and share repurchases and on the other hand a decrease 
of the target companies’ mergers and acquisitions activities. Brav et al. (2009) also find an increase of the 
ROE and leverage as well as like Boyson and Mooradian (2007), Klein and Zur (2009) or Mietzner et al. 
(2011) an increased extraction of cash. In contrast, Karpoff (2001) and Drerup (2011) do not find significant 
improvements of the target firms’ earnings or operating performance. Only slight changes of the companies’ 
governance structures could be forced by shareholder activists. Klein and Zur (2009) speak about a 
deterioration of profitability because of the lacking impact of shareholder activism on the targets’ accounting 
profitability. Shareholder activists do not initiate cost focused restructuring measures or extract cash. 
Compared to the behaviour of corporate raiders in the 1980s, today’s activists also do not force companies 
to load their capital structure with massive leverage (Bratton, 2007).  
 
After reviewing the various large sample study results, it is not clear if shareholder activism leads on average 
to an improvement or deterioration of shareholder value and successfully impacts the target firms’ 
operational and financial performance. One reason for the mixed results could be the incorporation of 
different data into large sample studies. Especially with regard to the analysis of short-term or long-term 
positive abnormal share price reactions, the use of different points of time of share purchases by activist 
investors could affect the results. The data availability based on the different national publication 
requirements could also massively influence the corresponding analysis and results. Large sample studies 
of Brav et al. (2009) and Klein and Zur (2009) for example are using publicly available date whereas Becht 
et al. (2010a) incorporate transaction data of private, i.e. non-public, engagements. These analytical 
approaches lead to the use of different target entry dates and statements about the improvement or 
deterioration of shareholder value by activist shareholders. Moreover, Gillan and Starks (2007) note that 
some short-term positive abnormal share price effects could be explained with the profiles and track-records 
of successful activist funds.  
 
According to the critical comparison and review of recent large sample study findings, the mixed statements 
regarding the success and impact of shareholder activism in general and the specifics of the German 
corporate governance system and corporate environment in particular, I therefore decided to use a case 
focused design for this study based on the following reasons:  
- The setting and methodology of large sample studies fail to analyse specific questions of an activist 
event as these studies focus on potential past changes of share prices or key financials only rather 
than to look at the entire activism process in more detail. Questions regarding the target’s 
performance prior to the event, the activist’s objectives and demands, the impact of the activist’s 
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actions on the target and its performance as well as the final success rate of the activist could only 
insufficiently be answered. 
- The already mentioned differences between the U.S. and German corporate environment and capital 
market requirements hamper the direct transfer of U.S. study results to Germany. Especially, the 
appearance of a family business investor as active investor in addition to the typical activist hedge 
fund shows the distinctive feature of this case.  
- Large sample studies are basically focusing their analyses on relatively small time periods whereas 
a clinical study enables to examine the specific event or topic over a much longer time period. 
 
I decided on KUKA as objective of investigation on shareholder activism as the confrontation between the 
company, Guy Wyser-Pratte and Grenzebach perfectly combines the specific characteristics of the corporate 
environment in Germany with attributes of a typical shareholder activism case. The appearance of 
Grenzebach as active family business investor following the engagement of a traditional activist hedge fund 
enables to complement the existing research on the topic with this typical component of the German 
corporate environment. Moreover, the eight years long sample period (from Wyser-Pratte’s share purchase 
end of October 2003 until the end of KUKA’s financial year 2011) allows to get coherent information about 
the potential success of both investors as well as the long-term impact of the shareholder activism on the 
company’s key financials. With a free float of 100% and a highly diversified but only partial profitable 
business structure prior to the first activist event, KUKA perfectly fits into the target firm characteristics as 
mentioned by various studies on shareholder activism (see for example (Gillan and Starks, 1998), (Bethel 
et al., 1998), (Drerup, 2011), (Boyson and Mooradian, 2007), (Judge et al., 2010)).  
 
III.4. Background Information about the Key Players and the Activist Case 
III.4.1. Background Information about KUKA prior to the First Activist Event in 2003 
KUKA Group, which is the new name of the company following the renaming from IWKA in 2007, is one 
of the largest suppliers of robots and automated production systems worldwide. In 2011, the company 
generated sales revenues of Euro 1.4 billion (please refer to Table III.10.) and employed more than 6,500 
people worldwide. The robotics segment achieved around 40% and the systems segment around 60% of the 
group’s revenues.42 The company’s key customers are top tier automotive companies as well as other 
industrial manufacturing companies. KUKA is ranked at least amongst the top 3 companies in its respective 
segments worldwide. The shareholder structure of the exchange listed firm consists of some large 
shareholders like Grenzebach (19.8%), Swoctem (5.1%), AXA (5.0%), Bank of America (3.1%) and other 
                                                          
42 Based on KUKA’s annual report 2011. 
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institutional and private investors with 64.0%.43 The corporate governance structure of the company is based 
on the two-tier standard with an executive management board and a supervisory board.  
 
Table III.10. Key Financials of KUKA 
Source: Non-adjusted financials from KUKA’s annual report of each corresponding financial year. 
 
In 1970, the German entrepreneurial family Quandt decided to merge its two portfolio companies, KUKA 
GmbH and Industrie-Werke Karlsruhe AG, to become Industrie-Werke Karlsruhe Augsburg 
Aktiengesellschaft, or IWKA AG, headquartered in Karlsruhe. In 1980, the Quandt family exited its 
investment and IWKA became a publicly listed firm with 100% free float. Due to the run out of KUKA’s 
voting right restrictions based on corporate law changes in the first half of the year 2000, the management 
feared to become a takeover target. The capital market considered this scenario as quite possible. In view of 
this threat and due to limited internal growth potential in general, CEO Hans Fahr and his management team 
decided to start streamlining its business activities and to focus the company more on future growth areas 
like the automotive and consumer goods industry. Therefore, the company started in 1999 an intensive 
M&A process which resulted in the acquisition of the subsidiaries of Jagenberg, a part of Rheinmetall group, 
and of the U.K. based BWI Group. These acquisitions massively strengthened the existing packaging 
business and tripled its sales. Additionally, KUKA decided to exit its defense engineering business after 127 
years by a sale to Rheinmetall. To broaden its U.S. presence, KUKA also acquired the U.S. welding plant 
manufacturer Key-Welder and B&K Group.  
At the beginning of the new millennium, KUKA was a highly diversified conglomerate with its 
business segments production technology, manufacturing technology, process technology, and packaging 
technology and more than 90 subsidiaries worldwide. Despite the strategic reorientation and M&A efforts, 
capital market participants had doubts about the sustainability of KUKA’s business focus. The analysts of 
SalomonSmithBarney (2000) for example missed a radical strategic move and criticised the ongoing 
underperformance of the process technology division which was mainly due to the limited critical mass of 
                                                          
43 Shareholder structure as of July 2014. 
(in € million) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Sales 2.220,0 2.290,0 2.312,0 2.287,0 2.169,0 1.613,0 1.566,0 1.286,0 1.266,0 902,0 1.079,0 1.436,0
EBIT 50,8 68,9 73,4 81,1 101,8 -30,7 33,7 70,5 52,0 -52,9 24,8 72,6
Pre tax income 42,2 36,5 45,9 56,2 84,4 -48,7 15,7 62,5 47,0 -64,4 -4,5 46,0
Tax -11,2 -5,3 -23,4 -32,8 -33,8 0,1 -4,9 -13,6 -16,5 -11,4 -4,1 -16,1
Net income 31,0 31,2 22,5 23,4 48,8 -147,5 -69,4 117,9 30,6 -75,8 -8,6 29,9
Assets 1.589,0 1.577,0 1.515,0 1.502,0 1.660,0 1.553,0 1.071,0 888,0 866,0 726,0 985,0 1.078,0
Equity 353,8 367,1 386,6 387,8 358,0 189,1 126,7 233,5 213,5 160,8 198,1 252,4
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this division and the increased price competition within this sector. Therefore, analysts asked for additional 
divestments or restructuring measures in the future. The management knew that something had to change 
and that their efforts should focus on a consequent strategic realignment and measures to increase the 
company value in the forthcoming months. This was the initial situation when U.S. financial investor Guy 
Wyser-Pratte informed the German financial authorities and KUKA about its share purchase which 
exceeded the 5% threshold of the voting rights on 27 October 2003.  
 
III.4.2. Background Information about Guy Wyser-Pratte 
Guy Patrick Wyser-Pratte, born in June 1940 in Vichy, France, is founder, CEO, President and COO of the 
employee owned investment company Wyser-Pratte Management Co., Inc. based in New York, United 
States. The firm is an investment vehicle for individuals or institutions like pension funds or trusts, managing 
various active investing funds which are focusing on undervalued especially European public listed 
companies. His major objective is always to achieve an increase in shareholder value following his entry. 
Normally, he focuses on conglomerates in the metal and defence industry with a high free float and acquires 
not more than 5% of a company’s outstanding shares. His company specific investment horizon varies from 
some months to several years. In 1991, Wyser-Pratte resurrected the former family firm, became an 
independent investment manager and acted as influential activist investor since then.  
Until his attempt to change KUKA’s strategic focus starting end of October 2003, he already tried 
to influence the boards of different German companies like Mannesmann (1999), Rheinmetall (2001), 
Babcock Borsig (2002) and Mobilcom (2002). He succeeded with his Rheinmetall engagement by forcing 
the management to focus on two business divisions in future only but failed with his activism strategy in 
the other cases. Especially with the insolvency of Babcock Borsig shortly after his entry, he lost 
approximately Euro 15 million, a newspaper speculated (Smolka and Sosalla, 2005). Answering the 
question of why he mainly focuses the investments of his EuroValue fund on German corporations, he said 
in an interview: ”In the United States, poor companies have poor prices. It's a different situation in Germany. 
A company's stock can be floundering while real wealth is hidden somewhere in its books, sometimes even 
for decades. We're interested in that wealth.” (Hornig, 2005) 
 
III.4.3. Background Information about Grenzebach  
As medium-sized family owned and privately held company, Grenzebach is a typical representative of the 
traditional German “Mittelstand” based in the Bavarian small town Hamlar, north of Augsburg, Germany. 
With around 1,400 employees the company produces manufacturing equipment and systems mainly 
focusing on material flow and process technology. Customers are companies in various industries like 
furniture, creamery, glass, building materials, transport and solar. The roots of today’s company lie in a 
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repair shop for agricultural machines founded 1920. In 1960, Rudolf Grenzebach founded the Grenzebach, 
the core company of today’s company group, and is President of its Board. In 1988, Grenzebach has started 
the global expansion of its service centres and production facilities with the foundation of a subsidiary in 
Newnan, Georgia, United States. Today, Grenzebach is also present in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Italy, 
Russia and Taiwan. According to the group’s consolidated statement for the financial year 2010, the group 
generated total revenue of Euro 362 million which is an increase of more than 30% compared to 2009. The 
glass technology division was responsible for 51% of the total sales, construction materials and furniture 
technology for 40% and general industry for 8%. The operating result was Euro 38 million in 2010 and Euro 
35 million in 2009.44  
 
III.4.4. The Activist Case 
The following description of the activist case focuses on the corresponding highlights and comprises the 
period starting with the entry of Wyser-Pratte end of October 2003 until the end of KUKA’s financial year 
2011. The information are divided into two parts, first, the confrontation of KUKA with Wyser-Pratte and 
second, the confrontation of KUKA with Grenzebach.  
 
III.4.4.1. The Confrontation of KUKA with Guy Wyser-Pratte  
On 28 October 2003, Guy Wyser-Pratte informed the management as well as the German financial 
authorities that his interest in KUKA exceeded the threshold of 5% of the voting rights the day before. A 
spokesperson of Wyser-Pratte mentioned that a further stake increase could be possible (Reuters, 2003a) 
and that Wyser-Pratte would welcome talks with the management about measures to increase the firm value 
(Reuters, 2003b). Knowing about Wyser-Pratte’s investment style, company representatives and insiders 
made clear that despite Wyser-Pratte’s entry the executive board will not mess up its current corporate 
strategy. On the occasion of the presentation of the interim full year financial figures for 2003, mid of 
February 2004, KUKA’s CEO Hans Fahr stated the future strategic focus on profitable growth areas like 
automation and manufacturing, the intention for portfolio adjustments but refused, with focus on Wyser-
Pratte, the divestment of a total business division. Wyser-Pratte welcomed these considerations.  
Few days before the official presentation of the annual financial results 2003, mid of April 2004, 
Wyser-Pratte started his first attack towards the management via a Reuters interview (Reuters, 2004a). He 
criticised that the strategy did not change so far and demanded personal consequences. “The time for talks 
will gradually come to an end”, he said (Reuters, 2004a). During the press conference, CEO Fahr announced 
the sale of unprofitable parts of the process technology division with approximately 15% of KUKA’s total 
                                                          
44 Source: German Federal Gazette; https://www.bundesanzeiger.de/ebanzwww/wexsservlet. 
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sales within the coming two to three years and expressed his surprise about the interview approach of Wyser-
Pratte. At the beginning of June 2004, Wyser-Pratte repeated his criticism on the strategic considerations 
and demanded the focus on the profitable automation business and on appropriate parts of the manufacturing 
business.  
To meet his requirements, he issued an ultimatum until KUKA’s AGM on 9 July 2004 and 
threatened the executive board with non-discharge from liability in support of other shareholders. Prior to 
the AGM, CEO Fahr presented in an interview the management’s decision to divest the complete process 
division instead of parts as intended earlier (Reuters, 2004c). Despite a combined stake of more than 18% 
in KUKA, the shareholder coalition of Wyser-Pratte (6.5%), U.K. pension fund Hermes (7%) and 
Threadneedle Asset Management (4.9%) failed with their countermotion to non-discharge the executive 
board in the course of the AGM. Following the AGM, CEO Fahr decided to accelerate the planned 
divestment process. But Wyser-Pratte signalised to increase his stake in KUKA and the potential convening 
of an extraordinary shareholder meeting on the one hand to indirectly achieve the dismissal of CEO Fahr 
prior to the regular AGM in 2005 and on the other hand to force the board to divest the packaging division. 
In preparation of KUKA’s regular annual general meeting on 3 June 2005, Wyser-Pratte published 
his comprehensive list of claims via the German Federal Gazette. First, he intended to file a motion to non-
discharge the whole executive board. Second, he argued for the deselection of two supervisory board 
members, Jürgen Hubbert, former member of the executive board of DaimlerChrysler, and Reinhard Engel, 
former CEO of Buderus, due to the reasons of conflicts of interest and insufficient control of KUKA’s 
executive board. Third, he nominated two own candidates Reiner Beutel, former CEO of Bosch’s U.S. 
subsidiary Robert Bosch Tool Group, and Anton Dulski, CEO of Minerals Technologies. Wyser-Pratte also 
mandated the proxy service firm MacKenzie Partners to campaign for his plan. Additionally, he publicly 
speculated about a potential manipulation of the financials of KUKA’s robotics division to counter his 
arguments of a necessary strategic business concentration.  
Confronted with Wyser-Pratte’s demands and incriminations, CEO Fahr decided to resign just hours 
before the beginning of the AGM. The supervisory board accepted Fahr’s decision and the shareholder 
representatives decided, in case of a deselection of Hubbert and/or Engel during the AGM, to resign en bloc 
as well. At the end, the deselection of Hubbert and Engel failed also due to the fact that Wyser-Pratte 
abandoned his motion shortly before. But the attending shareholders voted against the formal approval of 
the actions of KUKA’s executive and supervisory board. 
Following the AGM, Wyser-Pratte issued again an ultimatum towards the supervisory board to 
reorganise itself and to focus the company on the robotics business until the end of August 2005. As 
mentioned in a Reuters interview (Reuters, 2005b), he already personally approached interested buyers for 
the whole packaging division. End of July 2005, the supervisory board appointed Wolfgang-Dietrich Hein 
as new CEO which was not agreed with other shareholders like for example Wyser-Pratte. Until his 
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appointment Hein was CEO of the plastic machine manufacturer Coperion Holding. CEO Hein contacted 
Wyser-Pratte and agreed to focus the company on its core competencies and review all business activities 
with regard to their future profit contribution. To reorganise KUKA’s supervisory board, an extraordinary 
shareholder meeting was held on 9 November 2005 and elected amongst others Wyser-Pratte’s candidate 
Reiner Beutel, CFO of Schefenacker. Rolf Bartke became the new chairman of the supervisory board.  
In the meantime, the management successfully divested several businesses and started restructuring 
measures which became necessary due to the economic downturn and in this context decreasing orders from 
customers in the automotive industry. The corporate reorganisation to become an automation company 
proceeded but in August 2006, KUKA had to announce a profit warning. Wyser-Pratte increased his stake 
in KUKA to 9%. In autumn 2006, the supervisory board decided to review the potential sale of KUKA’s 
packing division which started some weeks after with the sale of the first subsidiary. But despite the ongoing 
corporate readjustments, members of the supervisory board increasingly expressed their disaffection with 
CEO Hein especially due to his hesitant corporate reorganisation. An internal power struggle with CFO 
Koch about the future strategy and positioning of KUKA additionally weakened Hein’s position. Wyser-
Pratte would welcome the resignation of Hein, he said to a newspaper (Elger, 2006). End of 2006, Hein 
decided to resign from his CEO position and the supervisory board appointed Gerhard Wiedemann as new 
CEO.  
Wiedemann was chairman of the board of the subsidiary KUKA Schweissanlagen and a member of 
KUKA’s executive board since 2006, responsible for the systems technology division. As his precursor, 
CEO Wiedemann intended to consequently expand the company’s core business and focus on the business 
areas automation and robotics. With the sale of the remaining packaging business in 2007, KUKA’s 
corporate structure finally consisted of two business divisions only. To emphasise the new corporate 
orientation, the annual shareholder meeting on 16 May 2007 agreed to the renaming of IWKA 
Aktiengesellschaft to KUKA Aktiengesellschaft. Against the background of sound financial results, the 
management of KUKA also intended to expand its growth efforts towards business areas like aviation, solar, 
medicine, food production and logistics. In June 2008, CEO Wiedemann decided to not extend his contract 
and the supervisory board appointed Dr Horst J. Kayser as new CEO of KUKA. Kayser was former CEO 
of Siemens U.K.  
 
III.4.4.2. The Confrontation of KUKA with Grenzebach 
Entitled as the expansion of the "Swabian alliance"45, the family owned firm Grenzebach Maschinenbau 
GmbH acquired a stake of 5.43% in one of its key business partners KUKA on 28 November 2008. Until 
                                                          
45 See joint press release from 4 December 2008: „ Swabian Alliance - Grenzebach Maschinenbau GmbH and KUKA 
expand global alliance”. 
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this share purchase both companies have already been working together: in the plat and solar glass 
industries, in the material and baggage handling sector as well as through a joint subsidiary in the U.S. On 
9 March 2009, Grenzebach informed KUKA as well as the public about its further stake purchase in KUKA. 
Grenzebach held more than 10% and intended to acquire additional 9% if agreed by cartel authorities. The 
company mentioned that it strives for a stake in KUKA of between 25.1% and 30%. Bernd Minning, 
Chairman of the board of Grenzebach, stressed that Grenzebach will act as an active and stabilising 
shareholder who is interested in a constructive cooperation and will admit to KUKA’s existing divisional 
structure (Grenzebach, 2009).  
Within the three weeks following the recent stake increase of Grenzebach in KUKA, the proposed 
cooperation was burdened with speculations and more or less public incriminations about financial 
irregularities and fictitious transactions between KUKA and Grenzebach in 2007. Additionally, KUKA’s 
CEO Kayser questioned in a newspaper if the senior managers of Grenzebach really share the same strategic 
concept for KUKA (Busse et al., 2009). But at the end of March 2009, both parties agreed that Grenzebach 
will obtain two seats in KUKA’s supervisory board. Furthermore, Grenzebach mentioned its support for 
KUKA’s corporate strategy with its focus on automation and robotics.  
But the dispute between KUKA and Grenzebach flared up again as Grenzebach made an application 
for an extraordinary shareholder meeting on 12 August 2009. The meeting should take place in autumn 2009 
to call for a vote of non-confidence against CEO Kayser and CFO Rapp, to dismiss supervisory board 
chairman Bartke as well as to elect new supervisory board members. Grenzebach justified this application 
with KUKA’s unsatisfying development into growth markets beyond the automotive industry like medical 
and solar technology as well as airport logistics and the lack of measures to compensate the recent declines 
in orders and secure the company’s financing. KUKA’s executive and supervisory boards criticised the 
approach of Grenzebach as strange and not justified especially as shareholder with a stake below the 
important 30% threshold level. But both boards declared to strive for an ongoing constructive cooperation 
with Grenzebach. Nevertheless, in the course of the extraordinary supervisory board meeting on 3 
September 2009 both boards agreed to end the appointments of CEO Kayser and CFO Rapp. The former 
lawyer and investment banker Till Reuter was appointed as chairman of KUKA’s supervisory board, 
according to his role as Grenzebach confidant and representative of investment firm RINVEST AG, and 
Wyser-Pratte, beside three others, became supervisory board member. End of September 2009, Reuter was 
appointed as temporary CEO of KUKA and Grenzebach’s chairman of the board Minning followed Reuter 
as chairman of KUKA’s supervisory board. End of April 2010, Reuter was named permanent CEO of 
KUKA. 
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III.5. Data Collection and Methodology 
To answer the study’s key questions regarding the potential success and impact of shareholder activism on 
KUKA, the methodology of the analysis is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the activist 
investors’ potential success concerning the assertion of their demands towards KUKA’s management and 
supervisory board in the course of the whole activist campaign. The second part comprises the impact of the 
shareholder activism on KUKA’s performance.  
According to Karpoff (2001), one reason for the inconsistent results of large sample studies is the 
diverse definition of the activists’ success. Boyson and Mooradian (2007) defined “success” as enforcement 
of the activists’ exact motive (like stated in the 13D SEC filing) and “partial success” as assertion of some 
demands, for example obtaining one supervisory board seat instead of the demanded two seats. Brav et al. 
(2008) classified a demand as successful when the activist gets the management to acquiesce to its main 
stated goal. If the activist asserts parts of the main goal for example through negotiations, a partial success 
is noted.  
With regard to the different methodologies of defining the success of shareholder activism and the 
missing requirements in Germany to officially state the goals of a share purchase, I decided on a combined 
definition and approach. I evaluate the assertion of a demand as “success” when, first, the activist got the 
management to fully acquiesce this demand and, second, the demand has been clearly identified as the 
activist’s main stated or most frequently repeated goal. As “partial success” counts the full assertion of other 
demands, i.e. non-main stated or non-most frequently repeated goals, or the partial assertion of all goals 
requested by the activists.  
The various demands and their frequency of Wyser-Pratte and senior representatives of Grenzebach 
towards KUKA have been hand-collected and identified from different online databases over the period 
from the first threshold exceeding by Wyser-Pratte end of October 2003 to KUKA’s fiscal year end 2011 
(31 December 2011). This period has been chosen due to the fact that Wyser-Pratte reduced its stake below 
5% in September 2010 and that both investors became less active than the years before. The data sources 
included Factiva and different corporate websites, like KUKA and Grenzebach. The analysis of the 
successful assertion of these demands followed the same methodology. Finally, the results of the analysis 
have been compared with findings of the large sample studies to identify any consistency or ambiguity.  
To analyse the impact of the activist engagement of both investors on KUKA, I used three different 
methods: DuPont model, analysis of KUKA’s investment and divestment history and buy-and-hold return 
(BHR) analysis. According to for example Milbourn and Haight (2005), DuPont is used to evaluate a firm’s 
financial condition by comparing relationships within the income statement and balance sheet, or between 
the two statements. It is an adequate tool to calculate the return on equity (ROE) of a company expressed 
through three major parts: the company’s profit margin, asset turnover and equity multiplier. Due to its 
model kit like approach, these operating figures could be broke down into more specific and interpretable 
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financial figures and ratios (Soliman, 2008). This method has been invented by the U.S. DuPont Corporation 
in the 1920s as operating and financial control instrument.   
 
The formula I used for the analysis is the following:  
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 =
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
=
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
∗
𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠 (𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇)
∗
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
∗
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
∗
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
   
 
The ratio  
𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
  gives information about the company’s tax burden,  
𝑃𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
  about its 
interest burden,  
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
  valuates the company’s operating margin, i.e. its profitability,  
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
  informs about 
its capital turnover, i.e. the operating efficiency, and the ratio  
𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
  gives information about the company’s 
financial leverage. The detailed breakdown of these financial figures allows tracing the development of the 
company over a long period of time as well as the impact of strategic and operational decisions. For the 
calculation of the various financial ratios, the financial data was hand-collected out of the corresponding 
annual reports of KUKA over the time period from 2000 to 2011. Following the analysis, the results of the 
DuPont model have been compared to the results of a peer group. As there are no complete comparable 
companies according to KUKA’s various businesses, the peer group is based on companies mentioned by 
either KUKA or capital market analysts as appropriate. The peers mainly consist of mid to large cap German 
machine and equipment manufacturers (Gildemeister, Krones, Dürr and Siemens) and one of KUKA’s 
major competitor in the robotics business (the Japanese Fanuc). The financial data of this peer group were 
collected via Bloomberg.  
To specify if the management of KUKA already started the divestment process of under-
performing business parts before the engagement of Wyser-Pratte in October 2003 as stated by CEO Fahr 
several times (for example Reuters, 2004c), the company’s investment and divestment history was analysed 
from the years 1999 to 2011. The necessary data was hand-collected from the annual reports and the 
corresponding changes of the company’s scope of consolidation. Business parts or companies intended for 
disposal were for example classified as discontinued operations.  
A BHR model was used to analyse a potential increase or decrease in shareholder value in the course 
of the activist process. According to Becht et al. (2010a), I calculated the raw returns (BHR raw) of the 
KUKA share over different holding periods, especially with changing starting times like the beginning of 
the year 2000 or the respective dates of Wyser-Pratte’s and Grenzebach’s entry. For the same periods, I 
additionally calculated the raw abnormal returns (BHR AR) over the German mid-cap benchmark index 
MDAX. I decided for the MDAX index as benchmark as it contains 50 stocks which are representing the 
German medium sized company sector and therefore perfectly fit to KUKA.  
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III.6. Results 
III.6.1. Assertion of Demands 
Guy Wyser-Pratte was fully successful (100%) in getting the boards to acquiesce to his main stated goal, 
the full structural reorganisation of KUKA. From the very first beginning following his share purchase in 
October 2003, he forcefully demanded and most frequently repeated a changed business focus on the 
profitable automation and appropriate parts of the manufacturing business in combination with the 
consequent divestment of the process and packaging divisions.46 With the management decision to divest 
its packaging business and focus on the businesses robots and automated production systems in the future 
only, Wyser-Pratte achieved his major objective in autumn 2006 nearly three years after his entry. In the 
course of the activist confrontation between Wyser-Pratte and KUKA, he also fully succeeded in achieving 
changes in KUKA’s management and supervisory boards, like for example the withdrawals of CEO Fahr 
(in June 2005) and CEO Hein (in December 2006).47 As these demands were less frequently repeated by 
Wyser-Pratte compared to his main goal of full business reorganisation, the successful assertion will be 
charged as 100% partial success. Additionally, he also succeeded with his later demand (i.e. 100% partial 
success) of supervisory board representation which was mentioned by Wyser-Pratte for the first time during 
the confrontation between Grenzebach and KUKA in August 2009. Overall, the analysis of the assertion of 
Wyser-Pratte’s demands and objectives during the whole activist process shows a success rate of 100%.  
In comparison to Wyser-Pratte, Grenzebach confronted the management and supervisory board of 
KUKA with fewer demands and objectives in a shorter period of time. Furthermore, Grenzebach did not 
directly express its demands through for example interviews like Wyser-Pratte the years before, but used 
insiders or unnamed confidants to express the demands to the media.48 Following the exceeding of the 5% 
threshold in November 2008 and the following share increase to more than 19% in March 2009, Grenzebach 
stated its two main goals, adequate board representation and the joint business expansion into for example 
aviation and solar technology.49 Additional demands have been publicly mentioned through a corporate 
release on 12 August 2009 focusing mainly on the dismissal of CEO Kayser and CFO Rapp as well as the 
replacement of most of the supervisory board members. With the agreement to receive two supervisory 
board seats end of March 2009, the withdrawals of CEO Kayser and CFO Rapp and the resignation of four 
supervisory board members, including Chairman Bartke, at the beginning of September 2009, Grenzebach 
fully succeeded with its major and other objectives within nine months. Through KUKA’s successive 
expansion into business areas like aviation and solar in recent years, Grenzebach accomplished its second 
                                                          
46 See for example following articles: Reuters (2004b) and Reuters (2004e). 
47 See for example following articles: Reuters (2004d), Reuters (2005a) and Reuters (2005b). 
48 See for example following articles: Reuters (2009b) and Reuters (2009c).  
49 See for example following articles: Reuters (2009a). 
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main goal as well. Overall, the active approach of KUKA by Grenzebach showed a success rate of 100%, 
i.e. in both categories full and partial success.  
The major demands of both investors do not differ from other studies (see for example: sale or spin-
off of significant company parts and improvement of long-term strategy (Bratton, 2007), changes on the 
corporate strategy (Brav et al., 2008), seeking board seats and forcing the buyout or sale of a division 
((Gillan and Starks, 2007), (Klein and Zur, 2006)), corporate governance changes (Pearson and Altman, 
2006) and pushing the CEO (Klein and Zur, 2006)). Overall, the demands and objectives of Wyser-Pratte 
and Grenzebach are mainly focusing on governance and strategy issues. The comparison of the various 
success rates does not show any major differences as well. Wyser-Pratte and Grenzebach show a success 
rate of 100% (i.e. full and partial success). The overall success rate of Brav et al. (2008) is more than 66%, 
of Klein and Zur (2006) is 60% and of Kühne (2011) is 53%. Klein and Zur (2006) report a success rate of 
100% concerning the replacement of the CEO and of 72% referring to board representation. Boyson and 
Mooradian (2007) also found that hedge funds are achieving board representation in over 70% of the time.  
 
III.6.2. Impact on KUKA 
The fragmentation into four different phases allows a more detailed analysis of the impact of the whole 
shareholder activism process on KUKA’s financial performance. The first phase comprises to financial 
years from 2000 to 2003, i.e. a time period prior to the full engagement of the activists. The second phase 
focusses on KUKA’s development from 2004 until the time when Grenzebach entered the firm end of 
November 2008. The third phase analyses the years 2009 until the end of the recent financial year 2011. To 
finally give evidence about the overall impact of the activism on the company, the analysis closes with phase 
four and an overall look at the company development between 2003 and 2011.   
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Table III.11. Overview of ROE Components: KUKA vs. Peer Group 
Sources: Annual reports of KUKA, Bloomberg, own calculations. 
III.6.2.1. Phase 1: 2000 – 2003 
Examining the first phase from 2000 to 2003 and referring to Table III.11., KUKA showed a strong increase 
in profitability (operating margin rose from 2.3% in 2000 to 3.5% in 2003) despite a more or less stable 
development in sales. But compared with the peer group, this performance was only below average (range 
from 2.6% to 28%). Despite the increase in profitability and efficiency, ROE decreased from 8.8% in 2000 
to 6.0% in 2003 mainly due to a lower leverage and higher tax costs. The analysis of the profitability of the 
four different business segments of KUKA (automation technology, manufacturing technology, process 
technology, and packaging technology) made clear that the company’s automation business generated 
significant positive operating margins only. Despite the performance improvements the share price 
development was unsatisfying. From the beginning of the year 2000 until the end of 2003, the share of 
KUKA showed a raw BHR of -25% and a raw BHAR over the MDAX benchmark index of -34%.  
Overall, the analysis of the financial and stock market performance of KUKA prior to the approach 
of Wyser-Pratte is also consistent with most of the typical target firm characteristics found in various sample 
studies on shareholder activism, like a low but positive operating performance ((Judge et al., 2010), (Klein 
and Zur, 2006 and 2009)), a low stock market valuation but with an attractive break-up value of the different 
business parts (Ellison et al., 2008). Other factors like the highly diversified conglomerate corporate 
structure and the differences in operating performance between the four business parts increased the 
possibility to become an activist target. 
 
(in %) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Net income/Pre tax income
KUKA 73,5% 85,5% 49,0% 41,6% 57,8% 302,9% -442,0% 188,6% 65,1% 117,7% 191,1% 65,0%
Arithmetic mean of peers 85,8% 5,6% 110,1% 733,0% 75,3% 46,8% 65,4% 64,8% 96,6% 99,5% 63,8% 69,9%
Pre tax income/EBIT
KUKA 83,1% 53,0% 62,5% 69,3% 82,9% 158,6% 46,6% 88,7% 90,4% 0,0% -18,1% 63,4%
Arithmetic mean of peers 159,6% 83,4% 66,3% 77,8% 74,1% 155,4% 77,9% 90,4% 74,9% 65,2% 62,7% 89,0%
EBIT/Sales
KUKA 2,3% 3,0% 3,2% 3,5% 4,7% -1,9% 2,2% 5,5% 4,1% -5,9% 2,3% 5,1%
Arithmetic mean of peers 9,5% 9,8% 7,6% 8,7% 10,1% 10,1% 11,8% 12,8% 14,1% 10,0% 8,7% 13,8%
Sales/Assets
KUKA 139,7% 145,2% 152,6% 152,3% 130,7% 103,9% 146,2% 144,8% 146,2% 124,2% 109,5% 133,2%
Arithmetic mean of peers 109,4% 111,8% 106,3% 105,5% 95,1% 99,4% 103,9% 105,3% 108,1% 87,2% 83,0% 95,3%
Assets/Equity
KUKA 449,1% 429,6% 391,9% 387,3% 463,7% 821,3% 845,3% 380,3% 405,6% 451,5% 497,2% 427,1%
Arithmetic mean of peers 280,6% 320,1% 350,5% 367,2% 332,9% 298,1% 288,0% 286,0% 275,2% 267,6% 284,3% 272,5%
ROE
KUKA 8,8% 8,5% 5,8% 6,0% 13,6% -78,0% -54,8% 50,5% 14,3% -47,1% -4,3% 11,8%
Arithmetic mean of peers 14,3% 11,1% 4,9% 2,9% 7,4% 7,4% 9,7% 12,9% 16,4% 1,2% 5,5% 12,6%
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III.6.2.2. Phase 2: 2004 – 2008 
The second phase from 2004 to 2008 was a very intense period of transition for KUKA. Confronted with 
the demands of Wyser-Pratte to consequently focus the company on its profitable businesses like robotics 
and partially manufacturing as well as to divest the process and packaging divisions, the management 
executed a massive strategic and structural reorganisation. Additionally, the CEO position was replaced 
twice at that time. According to various accounting based adjustments triggered by the introduction of the 
IFRS accounting standard in 2004 and the necessary classification into continuing and discontinuing 
operations due to the proposed divestments, the comparability of the respective financial years is difficult. 
In addition, the beginning of the global subprime and financial crisis as well as a sharp decrease of the 
worldwide demand for industrial goods and services affected this time period too.  
 With regard to Table III.11. it could be determined that the divestment of the process and packaging 
businesses with disposals of more than 60 consolidated companies led to a strong decrease in sales and 
EBIT as well as reductions on the balance sheet. Especially, the company divestitures in 2005 and 2006 
negatively affected the net income and therefore the ROE. Following these two years and compared with 
2004, the profitability of the whole phase until 2008 only slightly decreased (EBIT margin in 2004 of 4.7% 
to 4.1% in 2008). In contrast, the ROE improved from 13.6% to 14.3% which was mainly based on an 
improved efficiency. Comparing KUKA’s financial results of 2008 with the peer group still shows a below 
average profitability (KUKA’s EBIT margin of 4.1% vs. 14.1% arithmetic mean EBIT margin of the peer 
group with a range of between 6.5% and 40.5%). The ROE is slightly below average (range of 12.4% to 
21.3%) and efficiency as well as leverage is above average. The share price development is similar to the 
first phase. KUKA’s raw BHR from the beginning of financial year 2004 until the end of financial year 
2008 is -23%, the raw BHAR over the MDAX benchmark index -46%. 
 
III.6.2.3. Phase 3: 2009 – 2011 
This phase is affected by KUKA’s economic rebound following the period of strategic and structural 
reorganisation as well as the approach by Grenzebach and its demands for business expansion and 
replacement of senior managers and supervisory board members. KUKA massively improved its sales and 
turned the operating and net income from negative to positive (please see Table III.11.). The EBIT margin 
improved from -5.9% in 2009 to 5.1% in 2011 which is still below average compared to the peer group 
(range from 2.7% to 42.5%). The company’s efficiency increased and its leverage decreased both ratios lay 
above average. The ROE rose from -47.1% to slightly below average 11.8% in 2011 (range from 5.6% to 
19.1%). The share price development of KUKA reflects the positive financial development as well as the 
only below average profitability. The raw BHR between the beginning of 2009 until the end of 2011 is 
+14% but the raw BHAR over the MDAX benchmark index is -41%. 
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III.6.2.4. Phase 4: The Whole Company Development between 2003 and 2011 
The comparison of KUKA’s financial situation covering the whole activist engagement period gives 
evidence if the activism based demands increased the company’s overall profitability (please refer to Table 
III.11.). While the sales level decreased by 37% mainly due to the massive divestures, the company’s EBIT 
level declined only by -10%. This development resulted in a strong increase of EBIT margin (from 3.5% in 
2003 to 5.1% in 2011). The increased profitability and leverage led to a nearly ROE doubling from 6.0% in 
2003 to 11.8% in 2011. The clear concentration on the profitable business areas robotics and systems is the 
crucial factor of the improved group wide profitability.  
As outlined in Table III.12., the analysis of KUKA’s investment and divestment history between 
the years 1999 and 2011 showed that the massive corporate reorganisation especially in the years 2004 to 
2007 was executed due to the initiative and corresponding demands of Wyser-Pratte only. Contrary to the 
statements of CEO Fahr, KUKA did not realise major divestments prior to the beginning of the activist 
engagement.  
 
Table III.12. Overview of KUKA’s Divestments between 1999–2011 
 
 
With regard on the divisional profitability development, the robotics segment had an EBIT margin of 6.9% 
in 2003 and the other business segments generated operating margins of 0.7% at most. In 2011, robotics 
earned an EBIT margin of 8.3%, the systems business of 4.0%. But despite this positive development, the 
profitability of KUKA is still below the average profitability of its peer group (KUKA EBIT margin of 5.1% 
in 2011 vs. 13.8% arithmetic mean EBIT margin of peer group). The ROE on the other side is only slightly 
Year 
Sold companies  
(in total) 
Notes 
1999 2 Complete sale of defence business 
2000 1 Sale of long-distance heating control business unit 
2001 -  
2002 -  
2003 -  
2004 15 Partial sale of process technology business  
2005 15 
Sale of process technology completed; partial sale of 
manufacturing technology business 
2006 9 Partial sale of manufacturing technology business 
2007 22 Complete sale of packaging business 
2008 -  
2009 -  
2010 -  
2011 -  
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below the peer group’s average (11.8% vs. 12.6%), especially according to the peer group’s lower efficiency 
and leverage.  
The share price development from the day as Wyser-Pratte exceeded the 5% threshold level (27 
October 2003) until the end of financial year 2011 (31 December 2011) shows the value destroying effect 
of the engagement. According to Figure III.1., the raw BHR for the KUKA stock price in these more than 
eight years is -3%. The raw BHAR over the MDAX benchmark index in the same investment period is -
114%.  
The results regarding the impact of shareholder activism on KUKA are in line with most of the 
findings of large sample studies. Bethel et al. (1998) discover an increasing level of asset divestures 
following the purchase of a large company stake and a slight increase of the target companies operating 
performance. Brav et al. (2009) and Clifford (2008) both show improved ROA and ROE, mainly driven by 
the divesture of under-performing assets. Clifford (2008) and Klein and Zur (2009) determine an increase 
of the target company’s leverage. And Clifford (2008) additionally notices an increased rate of CEO 
replacements. The unsatisfying raw BHR and raw BHAR of the KUKA share price over an investment 
period of more than eight years are in line with the conclusion of Kühne (2011) that most activist studies do 
not show clear evidence regarding the realisation of long-term shareholder value following an activist 
approach.  
 
Figure III.2. KUKA Share Price vs. MDAX Benchmark Index from 27 October 2003 until 31 December 
2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100 = 27 October 2003, threshold exceeding of Wyser-Pratte; Source: Bloomberg. 
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III.7. Conclusion and Discussion 
My analysis shows that due to KUKA’s financial and stock market performance in the years prior to Wyser-
Pratte’s approach end of October 2003 as well as its highly diversified conglomerate and ownership 
structure, the firm possesses the typical characteristics of an activist target company. In the course of the 
activist process, both investors are 100% successful in getting the boards to acquiesce to their stated goals, 
like full strategic reorganisation, management and supervisory board changes and adequate supervisory 
board representation. The performance and purposefulness of both investors do not show major differences. 
Wyser-Pratte mainly demands the reorganisation of KUKA’s business whereas Grenzebach primarily 
strives for adequate board representation. This is comprehensible as Wyser-Pratte as a typical activist hedge 
fund manager intends to most efficiently benefit from his minority stake in KUKA via publicly demanding 
the company’s reorganisation and thus increasing the pressure on the KUKA management. And Grenzebach 
tries to benefit from its majority stake and therefore immediately demands an adequate board representation 
to exert influence in their sense.  
It could be determined that all demands and goals of both investors are focusing on structural and 
operational topics only rather than demanding financial changes like a higher leverage, a decrease of the 
cash level or the payout of an extra or higher dividend as large sample studies noted. These demands lead 
to massive divestures especially during the years of Wyser-Pratte’s most active phase 2004 to 2007, an 
improved profitability (EBIT margin and ROE) on group and business level, the three times replacement of 
KUKA’s CEO as well as various changes of the supervisory board composition. But despite the positive 
operational effects of the activist engagement, the analysis of the long-term raw BHR and raw BHAR over 
the MDAX benchmark index shows a different development. Wyser-Pratte faces the deterioration of 
shareholder value with raw BHR of -3% and raw BHAR of -114% (both time periods: 27 October 2003 
until 31 December 2011) whereas Grenzebach generates a positive raw BHR of +40% but negative raw 
BHAR of -26% (both time periods: 28 November 2008 until 31 December 2011). The negative long-term 
abnormal returns could be explained with KUKA’s positive but compared to a peer group only below 
average profitability.  
Overall, the typical German family owned company Grenzebach acted like a classical activist hedge 
fund and was slightly more successful than Wyser-Pratte. This analysis impressively shows that studies on 
shareholder activism, especially with focus on Germany, should also incorporate family business investors 
in future as they are seriously be able to act as shareholder activists beside typical activist hedge funds and 
active private equity funds. It could even be questioned if a family business investor is – compared to an 
activist hedge fund or active private equity fund – at the end the smarter investor who successfully targets 
companies following the engagement of another activist shareholder and benefits from the already 
implemented demands and actions. 
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IV. Family Business Investors versus Private Equity Investors – The Case of 
Continental Europe 
 
Summary50 
This study tests the hypothesis that family business investors and private equity investors in Continental 
Europe do not significantly differ from their investment approach and strategy. Therefore, I analyse 126 
announced acquisitions of listed Continental European firms by family business investors and private equity 
firms from the years 2002 to 2012. The results confirm my hypothesis as most of the differences between 
both investor groups are not statistically significant. Minor differences are mainly associated with their 
specific business model. The results partly fit with the existing research on shareholder activism. Due to 
their private equity like investment approach, I argue for the increased consideration of family business 
investors into the research on shareholder activism in Continental Europe. 
  
                                                          
50 The chapter IV. of this dissertation is largely based on the joint working paper of Schiereck/Schüler with the title 
Are Family Business Acquirers the New Private Equity Investors in Continental Europe? 
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IV.1. Introduction 
Dealing with the under-researched topic of shareholder activism in Continental Europe, it is absolutely 
necessary to have a closer look at the acting parties likes hedge funds and private equity investors as well 
as family business investors which became serious competitors in the area of direct corporate investments 
and mergers and acquisitions in recent years (Lehmann-Tolkmitt and Wattendrup, 2011). A study of Rödl 
et al. (2014) comes to the conclusion that family owned businesses will realise more strategic acquisitions 
in the future than in the past. Disposable assets, so-called family equity, will therefore be more and more 
invested into alternative investments in general and in other companies in particular ((Landgraf and Nagl, 
2009), (Wulf et al., 2011). Recent examples of these investment activities of German family investors are 
the hostile takeovers of Continental by Schaeffler and Volkswagen by Porsche as well as the share purchases 
of Klöckner & Co. by Knauf, of Douglas Holding by Müller or of Vossloh by family investor Heinz 
Hermann Thiele ((Lehmann-Tolkmitt and Wattendrup, 2011), (Becker, 2013)). 
The specifics of the Continental European (activist) investor landscape are primarily based on the 
unique characteristics of the Continental European corporate environments. The corporate environments of 
Continental European countries like for example Germany, France and Italy differ from Anglo-Saxon 
countries like the U.S. and the U.K. especially with regard to their legal systems and shareholder structures. 
The protection of private property respectively of outside investors is higher in Anglo-Saxon common law 
countries than in Continental European civil law countries (La Porta et al., 2000). The shareholder structures 
of Continental European countries are characterized by a high amount of large single investors like founders 
and families. In contrast to the U.K., a study from Franks et al. (2008) shows that family controlled blocks 
are the most important category of ownership in Italy, France and Germany. Of combined more than 550 of 
the largest listed companies in the four countries, 61.3% companies in Italy are family owned, 48.1% in 
France and 32.3% in Germany compared to 5.3% in the U.K. The study summarises that family ownership 
in Continental Europe is internationally at the high end and is in the U.S., Japan and U.K. among the lowest 
worldwide. 
As the research of family investors in Continental Europe is still limited and due to their growing 
importance as financial investor, I decided to focus the analysis of this study on the comparison of 
Continental European family business investors and private equity firms as representative of the traditional 
financial investor guild. My main objective of this study is to test the hypothesis that both investor groups 
do not significantly differ from their investment approach and strategy. This is to my knowledge the first 
study which compares the investment activities of Continental European family business investors with 
private equity investments and puts this topic thematically into the context of shareholder activism. This 
study will help to clarify if family business investors are able to successfully imitate the investment 
strategies of private equity firms and therefore to act like a traditional shareholder activist.  
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Overall, the results of this study confirm my hypothesis as most of the differences between both investor 
groups are not statistically significant. Minor differences are mainly associated with their specific business 
model. It could be summarised that family business investors in Continental Europe behave in a similar way 
like private equity investors and should therefore be involved as additional investor group in future studies 
on shareholder activism in Continental Europe. 
 
This study proceeds as follows: Paragraph 2 gives an overview of both analysed investor groups, i.e. family 
business investors in Continental Europe and private equity investors. In paragraph 3 I describe the data 
collection process and the methodology. Paragraph 4 presents the empirical results of my analysis. 
Paragraph 5 discusses the results and concludes the paper.  
 
IV.2. Description of Investor Groups 
IV.2.1. European Family Business Characteristics  
My definition of family business is based on Miller et al. (2007) who define a family firm as a company 
with multiple family members as insiders (officers or directors) or large owners (5% or more of the firm's 
equity) at the same time or over the life of the company as family descendants. As mentioned by Barontini 
and Caprio (2005), the ownership structure of the European corporate environment is amongst the most 
concentrated worldwide. They show that half of the sample companies have a shareholder with more than 
37% of the ultimate voting rights. The high concentration of corporate ownership in Europe highly differs 
from U.S., U.K. or Asian samples. Caprio et al. (2011) emphasise the results mentioning that the largest 
shareholder owns at least 20% of the equity capital in nearly two-third of the analyzed European firms. The 
majority of these companies are family controlled firms. According to Faccio and Lang (2002), 44.3% of 
the European corporate environment are family controlled. The average founding family ownership in 
family firms in Germany is 33.2% (Schmid et al., 2008).  
Some studies observe that family firms are smaller and younger than non-family firms, have higher 
cash levels and leverage ((Caprio et al., 2011), (Schmid et al., 2008)). With regard to the age of family firms, 
Franks et al. (2012) distinguish between family firms in the U.K. and Continental Europe. In the U.K., they 
observe a negative correlation of firm age with the probability of family ownership. For countries like 
Germany, France and Italy, it is more likely that older firms are family controlled. Franks et al. (2012) add 
that the existence of family control is more persistent in countries with weak investor protection and 
corporate control which links this topic to the already mentioned differences in legal and governance 
systems in Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe. Nevertheless, agency issues can affect family 
firms in different jurisdictions as well.  
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Morck and Yeung (2003) describe that the key difference between widely-held firms and family 
firms is that agency issues in the latter involve managers acting solely for one shareholder, i.e. the family, 
and in the former involve managers not acting for shareholders. This management focus on one major family 
shareholder can also explain the higher sensitivity and risk aversion concerning investment decisions of 
family firms (Bianco et al., 2009). Caprio et al. (2011) confirm this conclusion mentioning the negative 
correlation between the size of voting rights held by the largest shareholder and the propensity to make 
acquisitions whereas family firms are less likely to become acquirers. The aversion to acquisitions is linked 
to the size of the family stake and the requirement to not significantly dilute this stake following an 
acquisition. Large shareholders and especially controlling families frequently support cash deals for this 
reason (Caprio et al., 2011). Contrary to the U.K., Continental European family firms tend to acquire more 
frequently other family firms and pursue less diversifying transactions (Franks et al., 2012). According to 
Franks et al. (2008) family firms show a significant industry concentration. Nearly half of the analyzed 
family firms in U.K., Germany, Italy and France are concentrated in five of 48 Fama-French industries: 
wholesale, business services, retail, financials and household products.51 Overall, it can be stated that family 
firms are primarily active in non-financial industries compared to widely-held firms.  
 
IV.2.2. Private Equity Investors 
Private Equity has its origins in the U.S. The world’s first private equity firm was Kohlberg Kravis Roberts 
& Co. L.P. (KKR) founded in 1976 by Jerome Kohlberg, Henry Kravis, and George Roberts. The first 
private equity fund of KKR was raised two years later in 1978. Triggered by a buyout boom during the 
1980s, private equity gained attention by the public and gradually emerged in Europe, first in U.K. and later 
in Continental European countries ((Seretakis, 2013), (Achleitner et al., 2013)).  
Market deregulation in European jurisdictions in the course of the millennium change resulted in 
increased business activities and helped the private equity industry to finally disassociate itself from its 
predecessors, the corporate raiders ((Cheffins and Armour, 2011), (Seretakis, 2013)). With regard to 
transaction value and volume, the U.K. is still the most important market for private equity firms in Europe. 
In Continental Europe, Germany and France are the countries with the highest investment activities of 
private equity firms. The high amount of family businesses, especially in Germany, their investment needs 
and divestment strategies contributed to the positive development of private equity in the last two decades 
(Seretakis, 2013). 
 
                                                          
51 Franks et al. (2008) additionally describe differences across countries, for example, in Italy only 32% are in the top 
five industries compared with 65% in France, 56% in Germany and 44% in the U.K. 
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Compared to the other major representative of shareholder activism, the hedge funds, private equity funds 
act more like “value creators” who have a long-term focus and try to increase shareholder value through 
financial engineering and other improvements ((Judd, 2006), (Gillan and Starks, 2007)). The motives of 
private equity investments differ from case-to-case and are related to the funds’ investment strategy and the 
targeted share of ownership and control (Achleitner et al., 2013). These funds become active investors if 
they are confronted with poor performing companies and/or management and ownership structures violating 
good corporate governance. Under those circumstances, the private equity investors consider to actively 
take actions to influence and alter the decision process and corporate governance of their targets ((Cheffins 
and Armour, 2011), (Rauch and Umber, 2012)). More than half of the private equity firms are pursuing such 
active investment strategies and are successful in addressing agency problems in their target firms ((Rauch 
and Umber, 2012), (Schweizer and Mietzner, 2014)). Due to the success of such an active investment 
approach primarily initiated by private equity firms and hedge funds, more investors like for example family 
business investors increasingly adopt these strategies and engage with target firms in a comparable way 
(Shadab, 2009).  
 
IV.3. Data Collection and Methodology 
IV.3.1. Sample 
In order to analyse the key objectives of this study, I compiled a list of acquisitions of public listed 
companies based in Continental Europe by family business investors and private equity firms. My sample 
data consists of 126 announced acquisitions. 56 of these companies were acquired by family business 
investors; the remaining 70 by private equity investors. The analysed time period comprises the years 2002 
to 2012 which covers two periods of rising stock prices (2003 to 2008 and 2009 to 2012) and the global 
financial crisis between the years 2007 and 2009.  
IV.3.2. Data Collection 
The main source of the data collection process was Bloomberg. In a first step, I compiled a comprehensive 
list of approximately 1,500 announced deals of private investors targeting public listed companies between 
2002 and 2012. Key selection criteria were: target headquarters in Continental Europe52, a sufficient deal 
size of at least Euro 100 million (see for example the selection criteria of Hege et al., 2013), a deal identified 
as mergers and acquisitions (M&A) or investment transaction as well as the corresponding purchase of a 
stake of more than 30% in the target company. Due to the different accounting rules of financial service 
                                                          
52 I focused the search on the following major Western Continental European countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Spain and The Netherlands. Due to their importance as legal place 
of business, I added Cyprus and Luxemburg to the list.   
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companies, I also limited the sector and industry focus on non-financial companies and excluded banks, 
insurance and real estate companies. In a second step, I adjusted the deal list and removed transactions and 
companies with wrong industry group or sector classification, missing public listing status and/or stock price 
data. In a third step of sample adjustment, I concentrated my efforts on both investor groups, i.e. family and 
private equity investors, and went through all remaining transactions. For the verification of each transaction 
I used publicly available information like news coverage via Factiva or corresponding press releases as well 
as the official transaction documentation (like tender offer documents) which were available via the websites 
of the different Continental European financial supervisory agencies (like for example the German federal 
financial supervisory agency BAFin).  
With regard to the announced deals of family business investors, I deleted all cases with 
involvement of private equity investors as my focus is solely on family investors. I analysed each single 
family business in accordance to the definition of Miller et al. (2007) who additionally differentiate between 
the categories of first and second generation family firms as well as lone founder family firms which I 
combined in one category “Family firm” only. I therefore followed the definition of Anderson and Reeb 
(2003) and Villalonga and Amit (2006) who also combine family and lone founder firms to one category. 
Like with the family business transactions, I went through all remaining private equity investments 
and adjusted them to my key selection criteria. Following the approach of Achleitner et al. (2013), I checked 
publicly available information on each specific transaction and corresponding private equity investors. I 
excluded for example transactions which were conducted by investment banks and not by their private 
equity divisions, buy-outs of the companies’ management and transactions led by private investment groups 
or consortia. In a final step, I checked both remaining family business and private equity transactions for 
double appearance in my list. For example, on 23 May 2011 it was publicly announced53 that the private 
equity company CVC Capital Partners acquired a majority stake of around 64% of the capital of the French 
railroad-equipment maker Delachaux SA. The stake has been sold from the Delachaux family and its 
holding companies Sogrepar and Sodelho. The transaction appeared in my deal list for the second time when 
CVC Capital Partners launched a public tender offer for the remaining public-owned shares on 8 September 
2011 to take the company private. Here and in similar cases, I excluded the respective second transaction 
announcement to avoid the use of deal affected share price movements into my event studies as capital 
market participants were expecting a taking private and/or squeeze-out offer to the remaining public 
shareholders sooner or later. 
Following the final set up of my deal list, I collected the additional data for my comprehensive 
analysis. As I focus the study primarily on the target firm characteristics, I aggregated various financial and 
share performance data via Bloomberg. To calculate different key performance indicators (see for example 
                                                          
53 See for example Reuters article of Rouillon (2011). 
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Table IV.13. and Table IV.14.) covering for example profitability, leverage and cash level of each target 
company, I listed the corresponding financials over a 14-years period (from the year 1999 to 2012). As the 
sample period comprises some extreme market cycles between 2002 and 2012, I then calculated three-year 
averages for each annual data and performance indicator to smooth this impact. Additionally, I obtained the 
daily share price data via Bloomberg to conduct the event studies for each deal announcement. 
Table IV.13. Definitions of selected Key Performance Indicators 
The main source of all data is Bloomberg. The indicators are based on a three-year average of 
the corresponding financial years prior to the engagement by the investors. Beside the ordinary 
financial ratios, I conducted the remaining ratios as follows: 
 
Key Performance Indicators Definition 
Cash / Assets = Cash at year end / Assets 
Dividend Payout Ratio = Dividends paid / Net income 
Market to Book Value = Market capitalization at year end / Equity 
ROA = Net income / Assets 
 
 
IV.4. Analyses 
IV.4.1. Empirical Results 
The limited disclosure of public information and complicated company structures made it difficult to gather 
numerous and proper information about the specific acquirer companies, especially with regard to the 
family-owned companies. The data availability concerning the acquiring private equity companies is 
partially better as some companies are publicly listed and other publish comprehensive financial information 
like annual reports in their online investor relations section. Therefore, I limited the descriptive statistics of 
the acquirer companies to a few indicators only.   
Table IV.14. General Characteristics of Family Business and Private Equity Investors 
The data is based on various sources, e.g. Bloomberg, press coverage and corporate websites. 
Panel A shows the countries of origin of each analysed family business and private equity 
investor. Panel B tabulates descriptive data concerning the founding years of the family and 
private equity sample.  
 
Panel A: Geographic classification   
  Family Business Investors Private Equity Investors 
  # of Firms in % # of Firms in % 
Austria  2 4 1 1 
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Australia     1 1 
Belgium  2 4   
Cyprus  3 5   
Denmark  1 2   
Finland  2 4   
France  7 13 8 11 
Germany  12 21 1 1 
Italy  9 16 1 1 
Luxembourg  2 4 1 1 
Netherlands  5 9 5 7 
Norway  3 5   
Spain  5 9   
Sweden  3 5 14 19 
United Kingdom   24 34 
United States of America   13 19 
n.a.    1 1 
Total amount  56 100 70 100 
Thereof listed firms   7 10 
 
Panel B: Founding year 
  
Family 
Business 
Investors 
Private Equity 
Investors 
Mean   1946 1987 
Median   1957 1987 
Youngest  2011 2003 
Oldest  1819 1969 
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Table IV.14. gives a brief overview of two different characteristics of the analysed Continental European 
family business investors as well as of the private equity investors. Panel A shows that most of the family 
investors are situated in Germany (21%), followed by Italy (16%) and France (13%). Therefore, these largest 
Continental European countries54 consolidate half of all family acquirers. The geographic classification of 
the private equity investors indicates that these are primarily situated in the United Kingdom (35%), 
followed by Sweden (19%) and the United States (19%). 10% of my private equity sample are listed firms. 
The large amount of Anglo-Saxon private equity companies is no surprise and could be explained with the 
origin of private equity first in the United States and later in the United Kingdom.  
Panel B shows some descriptive statistics concerning the corresponding founding years of the 
family and private equity companies. The average founding age of all analysed family companies is 1946 
which argues for a signal to establish family companies following the end of the Second World War in 
Europe. But the range of my family companies is quite large as the oldest firm has been founded in 1819 
and the youngest in 2011. The average founding year of the private equity companies in this study is 1987, 
the year following the comprehensive deregulation of the stock market in the U.K. The founding year of the 
oldest firm is 1969 and of the youngest firm 2003.   
 
Table IV.15. Overall Transaction Characteristics between 2002–2012 
The data incorporates all samples in the analysed period and is based on Bloomberg. A double 
check occurred via public sources like press coverage and corporate websites. Panel A shows 
the respective industry classification of each sample subdivided into both investor groups, i.e. 
family business investors and private equity investors. Panel B tabulates the corresponding years 
of the respective transaction announcement again subdivided into both investor groups.  
 
Panel A: Industry Group Classification of Investment Targets 
Industry Group 
    
Family 
Investors 
Private 
Equity 
Investors 
Advertising   1 1 
Apparel     1 4 
Auto Parts / Equipment   1 2 
Beverages     2  
Building Materials   4 4 
Chemicals     2 4 
Commercial Services   3 2 
Computers     1  
Cosmetics / Personal Care  1 3 
                                                          
54 GDP Rank of Continental European countries in 2012: 1. Germany, 2. France and 3. Italy; excluding Russia; Source: 
International Monetary Fund Database. 
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Distribution / Wholesale     2 1 
Electrical Components / Equipment   2 
Electronics      3 
Energy-Alternate Sources   1 1 
Engineering / Construction     2 1 
Environmental Control   1  
Food     9  
Healthcare-Products / Services  2 9 
Holding Companies     1  
Home Builders   1 2 
Home Furnishings     1 3 
Housewares   2 1 
Internet     2 1 
Leisure Time   3 2 
Machinery-Diversified     3 2 
Media   2 1 
Metal Fabricate / Hardware      3 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing   1 
Oil / Gas and Services     1 5 
Packaging / Containers    1 
Pharmaceuticals     1 2 
Retail   2 5 
Software     1 1 
Telecommunications    3 
Transportation     2  
Trucking / Leasing     1  
Total amount     56 70 
   
Panel B: Transaction Announcements by Year  
Year of Announcement  
Family 
Investors  
Private 
Equity 
Investors 
2012   8 4 
2011  7 3 
2010   2 6 
2009  2 4 
2008   9 9 
2007  9 11 
2006   4 8 
2005  5 7 
2004   1 10 
2003  3 6 
2002   6 2 
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Total amount   56 70 
 
Table IV.15. lists the key characteristics of the target companies in the sample period from the year 2002 to 
2012. Panel A is the classification of the target companies into the various industry groups. The industry 
groups which most frequently appear as family investor targets are: Food, Building Materials, Commercial 
Services, Leisure Time and Machinery-Diversified. The most frequently represented industry groups of the 
private equity investors are: Healthcare, Retail and Oil & Gas. According to an unpublished comparison of 
the targets’ industry groups with the industry affiliation of the acquiring family investors, it can be stated 
that most of the family investors are looking for acquisition targets in their specific industry. The top three 
industry groups of the acquiring family investors are: Food, Building Materials and Commercial Services.55 
This is in line with the study of Franks et al. (2008) who mention the significant industry concentration of 
family firms in the Continental European countries Germany, Italy and France. Panel B shows the different 
years of the transaction announcements. With a peak of the family investor activities in the years 2007 and 
2008 and a strong recovery following the financial crisis in 2011 and 2012, the transaction activities of the 
private equity investors show a nearly similar development which slowed down a bit since 2010.  
 
Table IV.16. Key Performance Indicators of Target Companies prior to Engagement (2002 to 2012) 
This table shows various financial performance indicators to characterise the target companies 
of the family and private equity investors. The indicators are based on a three-year average of 
the corresponding financial years prior to the engagement by the investors. For the definition of 
the data, please see Table IV.13. The different columns show the number of observations, the 
means and medians of each variable as well as the corresponding test statistics. I conducted the 
t-Test for the difference in mean and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-Test for the difference 
in median between the target companies of both investor groups. ***, **, * and # indicate 
significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
  
Variables    
Family Firm 
Targets 
Private Equity 
Targets 
t-Test (Z-Test) 
for difference 
in means 
(medians) 
 
 Obs.  Obs.   
Transaction Volume in 
€m 
Mean  56 687 68 732 -0.233 
Median   225   464 1.328** 
       
Sales in €m Mean  55 2,250 67 2,553 -0.335 
Median   991   894 1.887 
       
ROA Mean  56 0.0432 70 0.0457 -0.221 
  Median   0.04   0.05 1.862 
       
                                                          
55 To focus on classical industry groups only, I excluded the most frequent family investor classification groups 
“Holding Companies” and “Investment Companies” from the analysis.  
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Cash / Assets Mean  56 0.0963 70 0.096 0.014 
  Median   0.06   0.065 1.804 
       
Dividend Payout Ratio Mean  46 0.4804 57 0.3184 -1.281 
  Median   0.335   0.25 1.108 
       
Debt / Assets Mean  56 0.6118 70 0.5873 0.842 
  Median   0.625   0.600 2.142 
       
Short-&Long-term 
Borrowings / Assets 
Mean  53 0.1602 70 0.1283 2.316* 
Median   0.150   0.135 2.223 
       
Market to Book Value Mean  53 2.266 67 3.384 -0.906 
  Median   1.570   1.710 1.598 
       
EBIT Margin  Mean  53 0.0755 68 0.081 -0.420 
  Median   0.070   0.080 1.561 
       
EBITDA Margin  Mean  54 0.160 68 0.1385 0.927 
  Median   0.120   0.120 1.772 
       
Freefloat Mean  44 33.96 54 50.21 -2.231* 
  Median   19.92   48.25 0.933 
       
Number of Employees Mean  55 7,922 69 10,306 -0.505 
  Median   2,689   3,407 1.702 
       
 
Table IV.16. shows key operating and financial indicators to analyse the performance of the target 
companies prior to the engagements by family business and private equity investors. I calculate indicators 
with focus on profitability, cash, leverage and market valuation. The comparison between the targets of both 
investor groups shows some differences but only a few are statistically significant like the differences of the 
transaction volume medians as well as the differences of the leverage indicator (Short- and Long-term 
Borrowings to Assets) and freefloat means. A careful summary of the mostly not statistically significant 
results indicates that family business investors make smaller transactions (Transaction Volume), focus on 
smaller companies (Number of Employees) with a higher dividend payout ratio, a slightly higher leverage 
(Short- and Long-term Borrowings to Assets), a cheaper market valuation (Market to Book Value) and a 
lower freefloat level.  
To predict if a public listed company could fit into the target scheme of rather a family business 
investor than a private equity investor, I used the financial data of the target companies for a two-step 
analysis. In the first step, I shortened the sample period to eight years (2002 to 2009) and calculated the 
operating and financial key performance indicators again (see Table IV.17.).  
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Table IV.17. Key Performance Indicators of Target Companies prior to Engagement (2002 to 2009) 
This table shows various financial performance indicators to characterise the target companies 
of the family and private equity investors. The indicators are based on a three-year average of 
the corresponding financial years prior to the engagement by the investors. For the definition of 
the data, please see Table IV.13. The table includes only samples with transaction 
announcements from the year 2002 to 2009. The different columns show the number of 
observations, the means and medians of each variable as well as the corresponding test statistics. 
I conducted the t-Test for the difference in mean and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-Test 
for the difference in median between the target companies of both investor groups. ***, **, * 
and # indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
 
Variables    
Family Firm 
Targets 
Private Equity 
Targets 
t-Test (Z-Test) 
for difference 
in means 
(medians) 
 
 Obs.  Obs.   
Transaction Volume in 
€m 
Mean  39 718 55 807 -0.371 
Median   259   519 0.752* 
       
Sales in €m Mean  38 2,416 53 2,019 0.566 
Median   1,152   950 1.089 
       
ROA Mean  39 0.0436 57 0.0454 -0.130 
  Median   0.040   0.050 1.069 
       
Cash / Assets Mean  39 0.0908 57 0.0851 0.284 
  Median   0.050   0.060 1.020 
       
Dividend Payout Ratio Mean  33 0.4430 48 0.3131 -0.784 
  Median   0.270   0.270 0.772 
       
Debt / Assets Mean  39 0.6364 57 0.5905 1.341 
  Median   0.640   0.600 1.319 
       
Short-&Long-term 
Borrowings / Assets 
Mean  37 0.1649 57 0.1307 2.174* 
Median   0.150   0.140 1.302 
       
Market to Book Value Mean  39 2.579 55 3.717 -0.720 
  Median   1.670   1.760 1.043 
       
EBIT Margin  Mean  39 0.0705 55 0.0836 -0.876 
  Median   0.080   0.080 0.904 
       
EBITDA Margin  Mean  38 0.1382 55 0.1444 -0.320 
  Median   0.130   0.120 0.975 
       
Freefloat Mean  32 43.888 46 55.275 -1.371 
  Median   38.04   67.01 0.634 
       
Number of Employees Mean  39 9,521 56 11,439 -0.310 
  Median   2,731   3,101 1.025 
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With only a few statistically significant results (differences in means and medians of Transaction Volume 
and Short- & Long-term Borrowings to Assets), most of the outcome is similar to the results of Table IV.16. 
In the second step of my analysis, I used the data of the eight years sample and conducted a binominal 
logistic regression with carefully selected performance indicators.56  
 
Table IV.18. Logit Model to predict targeting by Family Business or Private Equity Investors 
This table reports the results of the binominal logistic regression to predict the probability that 
a company could become an investment target of either family business investors or private 
equity investors. The column shows a set of selected key performance indicators (see also Table 
IV.13.) which consists of the target companies of both investor groups. ***, **, * and # indicate 
significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Constant       -2.351 
ROA       -14.353 
EBITDA Margin    -4.440 
Dividend Payout Ratio       -0.342 
Cash / Assets    6.850 
Short-&Long-term Borrowings / 
Assets     
12.773* 
Market to Book Ratio    0.399 
Freefloat       -0.008 
     
Obs.        63 
Likelihood Ratio       70.317 
Hosmer Lemeshow Test (p value)     0.930 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerkes Rsq)     0.275 
 
Table IV.18. shows the results of the logistic regression. As independent variables I test the efficiency and 
profitability (Return on Assets and EBITDA margin), dividend payout ratio, cash holdings (Cash to Assets), 
leverage (Short- & Long-term Borrowings to Assets), market valuation (Market to Book Ratio) and the 
freefloat. My regression model shows a good quality (low Nagelkerkes R2 and p value of Hosmer 
Lemeshow Test of above 0.05) but the result of only one indicator is statistically significant.  
The outcome of the leverage indicator reveals that companies with a higher leverage fit more into 
the target scheme of family business investors. Therefore this result is in line with the outcome of Table 
IV.16. and Table IV.17. and militates in favor for the business model of private equity investors to generate 
                                                          
56 Logistic regression tests with all or a large selection of the presented key performance indicators in Table IV.18. 
suggested high correlations between the figures, especially between the profitability and leverage indicators. I 
therefore decided to limit the indicators used in the regression and to focus on the most relevant.  
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excess returns via for example financial engineering with focus on increasing the leverage (see for example 
(Judd, 2006), (Achleitner et al., 2010), (Rauch and Umber, 2012)).  
A careful interpretation of the other not statistically significant results comes to the conclusion that 
the likelihood of companies of becoming a family business investor target is higher if these companies are 
less profitable, have higher cash holdings and leverage. Indicators like Dividend Payout Ratio, Market to 
Book Ratio and Freefloat are playing a minor role only.  
Following the binominal regression, I used the data of the target companies to test the quality and 
predictability of the regression model. To conduct t- and Z-Tests for differences in means and medians, I 
used the shortened three-year sample period from 2010 to 2012 and included the same key performance 
indicators as in the binominal regression. Table IV.19. shows the results of this analysis. 
 
Table IV.19. Key Performance Indicators of Target Companies Prior to Engagement (2010 to 2012) 
This table shows selected financial performance indicators which have been used in the 
binominal logistic regression (see Table IV.18.). The indicators are based on a three-year 
average of the corresponding financial years prior to the engagement by the investors. For the 
definition of the data, please see Table IV.13. The table includes only samples with transaction 
announcements from the year 2010 to 2012. The different columns show the number of 
observations, the means and medians of each variable as well as the corresponding test statistics. 
I conducted the t-Test for the difference in mean and the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U-Test 
for the difference in median between the target companies of both investor groups. ***, **, * 
and # indicate significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
 
Variables    
Family Firm 
Targets 
Private Equity 
Targets 
t-Test (Z-Test) 
for difference 
in means 
(medians) 
  Obs.  Obs.   
ROA Mean 17 0.0424 13 0.0469 -0.287 
  Median  0.050  0.060 0.102 
       
EBITDA Margin  Mean 16 0.2119 13 0.1138 1.627 
  Median  0.1100  0.1200 0.109 
       
Dividend Payout Ratio Mean 13 0.5754 9 0.3467 -1.243 
  Median  0.5000  0.2000 0.030 
       
Cash / Assets Mean 17 0.1088 13 0.1438 -0.926 
  Median  0.0600  0.1100 0.084 
       
Short-&Long-term 
Borrowings / Assets 
Mean 16 0.1494 13 0.1177 1.044 
Median  0.1250  0.1200 0.114 
       
Market to Book Value Mean 14 1.3957 12 1.8550 -1.379 
  Median  1.2650  1.4600 0.060 
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Freefloat Mean 12 7.4850 8 21.1188 -1.829 
  Median  5.2950  13.1300 0.028 
  
As mentioned above (see Table IV.18.), family business investors focus on less profitable companies with 
high cash holdings and leverage. Other indicators like Dividend Payout Ratio, Market to Book Ratio and 
Freefloat are less relevant. The results of Table IV.19. do not verify the tendency of the regression. The 
differences in means and medians are not statistically significant and most of the outcome contradicts the 
results presented earlier. The targets of the family business investors show nearly the same efficiency (ROA) 
and are more profitable (EBITDA Margin) as the target companies of the private equity investors, have less 
cash (Cash to Assets) and a considerably lower freefloat level. In addition, the market valuation (Market to 
Book Ratio) is lower and the Dividend Payout Ratio is higher as predicted by the binominal regression. The 
leverage (Short- & Long-term Borrowings to Assets) is the only key performance indicator that proves the 
results of the regression but without being statistically significant. Explanations for the contradictions 
between the results of the binomial regression and the test of its predictability can be the limited sample size 
of the years 2010 to 2012 as well as the accumulation of specific target industries in the three-year period 
which influence the results.   
For the analysis of the different market reactions in the course of the public announcements of the 
respective acquisitions by family business and private equity investors, I examined two different short-term 
event windows. I defined the event day (t=0) as the day of the first public announcement of the 
corresponding acquisition. The data was based on Bloomberg which I double checked via for example 
company press statements or official public tender offer prospectuses. I used the standard market model to 
calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and the mean cumulative abnormal returns (CAAR).57 
Due to missing share price data of the target companies, the sample group decreased by six family investor 
and eight private equity investor targets. The results of the event studies are shown in Table IV.20. 
 
Table IV.20. Market Reactions in the Course of Transaction Announcements 
This table shows the results of the short-term event studies across two different time windows. I 
used the standard market model with the Stoxx Europe 600 as benchmark index. The table covers 
the whole sample period from the year 2002 to 2012. The different columns show the number of 
observations, the number of positive versus negative returns, the means of the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CAR) and the results of the test statistics. I conducted the parametric t-Test 
and Boehmer Test and the non-parametric Corrado Rank Test. ***, **, * and # indicate 
significance at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels.  
                                                          
57 The standard market model is based on an estimation window of more than 250 trading days ending 10 days prior 
to the event day (t=0). My benchmark index was the Stoxx Europe 600 representing the major 600 public listed 
European companies. With the parameters calculated via the estimation window, I was able to compute the 
expected, abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the two different event windows. The abnormal return is 
the difference between the target company’s return and the expected return.   
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Event windows in days Obs. P / N CAR t-Test 
Boehmer 
Test 
Corrado 
Rank 
Test 
[-1,+1]   mean t-value z-score z-score 
Family Firm Targets 50 30 / 20 4.19% 7.14*** 2.44* 2.64** 
Private Equity Targets 62 31 / 31 2.11% 4.16*** 2.12** 1.82# 
[-10,+10]   mean t-value z-score z-score 
Family Firm Targets 50 29 / 21 10.14% 6.53*** 4.03*** 1.81# 
Private Equity Targets 62 32 / 30 6.46% 4.81*** 1.98* 0.64 
 
The results of the event studies show a high statistically significance, expressed by almost every statistical 
test. It can be concluded that the capital market participants evaluate the engagement of a family investor 
higher than the engagement of a private equity investor. The mean cumulative abnormal returns of both 
event windows (three-day and 21-day event window) of the family business investor targets exceed the 
returns of the private equity targets. Explanations for the different valuation could be that market participants 
believe in the ability of family firms to better integrate, manage and control the acquired companies or that 
family business investors just pay higher acquisition premiums to succeed against competing bidders like 
private equity or other strategic investors.  
To predict whether certain financial performance indicators influence the intensity of the market 
reactions in the course of the public announcements, I run a multiple regression for both investor groups. 
The results are shown in Table IV.21. 
 
Table IV.21. Summary of Multiple Regression 
These tables show the results of the multiple regression for each investor group, i.e. family 
business investors and private equity investors. To increase the quality of the regression, I 
limited the amount of key performing indicators. The different columns show the four 
independent variables, i.e. the selected key performance indicators (see also Table IV.13.), the 
unstandardized regression coefficient (B), the Standard Error of the coefficient (SEB) and the 
standardized coefficient (b). All columns are separated by the two different event windows 
(CAR3 = three-day and CAR21 = 21-day event window). ***, **, * and # indicate significance 
at the 0.1%, 1%, 5% and 10% levels. 
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IV.21.1. Multiple Regression for Family Business Investors 
Variable 
B SEB b 
CAR3 CAR21 CAR3 CAR21 CAR3 CAR21 
Intercept 0.234 0.281 0.076 0.099   
ROA -0.605 -0.645 0.699 0.911 -0.157 -0.129 
EBITDA Margin 0.054 0.091 0.220 0.287 0.047 0.061 
Cash / Assets -0.031 -0.097 0.302 0.394 -0.019 -0.045 
Short-&Long-term 
Borrowings / Assets 
-0.446 -0.613 0.417 0.544 -0.223 -0.235 
 
IV.21.2. Multiple Regression for Private Equity Investors 
Variable 
B SEB b 
CAR3 CAR21 CAR3 CAR21 CAR3 CAR21 
Intercept 0.212 0.192 0.055 0.066   
ROA 0.236 0.509 0.470 0.559 0.071 0.131 
EBITDA Margin -0.629 -0.684 0.325 0.387 -0.290# -0.268# 
Cash / Assets -0.179 -0.221 0.237 0.282 -0.103 -0.109 
Short-&Long-term 
Borrowings / Assets 
-0.096 0.117 0.304 0.362 -0.047 0.049 
 
The unstandardized coefficients (B) of the tables above indicate how much the dependent variables CAR3 
and CAR21 vary with an independent variable when all other independent variables are held constant. 
Despite a good quality of the model, only one independent variable coefficient (EBITDA Margin in the 
multiple regression table for private equity investors) is statistically significantly different from zero. The 
results show a large negative correlation between the announcement returns and the two performance 
indicators ROA and Short-&Long-term Borrowings / Assets, i.e. the announcement returns are higher for 
target companies which have a smaller ROA and leverage before the announcement.  
A careful interpretation of the results indicates that capital market participants assume that family 
business investors are able to generate value following the acquisition of a company through efficiency 
gains (expressed by ROA) and an increased leverage (Short-&Long-term Borrowings / Assets). According 
to the other regression results, profitability and cash holding of a target company do not particularly 
influence the capital market reaction. In comparison to the family investors, the profitability (expressed by 
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the EBITDA Margin) of the private equity targets has a greater impact on the announcement returns, i.e. the 
announcement returns are higher for target companies which are less profitable before the announcement. 
Capital market participants believe in the ability of private equity investors to generate value via focusing 
on profitability issues of their targets. The cash holding also influences the announcement returns but should 
always be considered in combination with the leverage of the targets.  
 
IV.4.2. Comparison with Related Research  
A comparison of my findings with especially U.S. based research should give more information about the 
classification of family investors within the universe of shareholder activism. Numerous research on 
shareholder activism focuses on the key characteristics of the target firms, the main element of this study. 
Especially the condition of the operating performance as key criterion of activist targets is kind of 
ambiguous. For example the studies of Bebchuk et al. (2015), Bethel et al. (1998), Cziraki et al. (2010), 
Ellison et al. (2008), Drerup (2011) and Gillan and Starks (1998) mention poor performance i.e. low 
profitability as key characteristic of activism targets. According to Bethel et al. (1998), target companies 
that are not experiencing a block purchase by activists have a pre-engagement median ROA (return to assets) 
of 15.5% compared to companies that encounter activist block purchases with a median ROA of 12.6%. In 
contrast, other also important studies come up with a different assessment. For Boyson and Mooradian 
(2007) and Klein and Zur (2006) strong operating performance i.e. high ROA is a distinctive characteristic 
of activism targets. Other target characteristics are large cash positions ((Boyson and Mooradian, 2007), 
(Brav et al., 2009), (Ellison et al., 2008), (Klein and Zur, 2006)) and low leverage ((Brav et al., 2009), 
(Cziraki et al., 2010), (Ellison et al., 2008)).  
The outcome of my analysis partly fit into the target scheme mentioned in the studies on shareholder 
activism. With regard to the undetermined aspect of profitability, my target results do not add definite results 
to the existing research. Based on the data, the logistic regression (see Table IV.18.) shows that family 
business investors target companies with poorer performance, i.e. lower efficiency and profitability (ROA 
and EBITDA margin). The predictions are not statistically significant and cannot be confirmed by the results 
of Table IV.19. The leverage of my sample firms targeted by family business investors is statistically 
significant higher than that of its private equity peers (see Table IV.16. and Table IV.17.). The cash positions 
are nearly similar (Table IV.16. and Table IV.17.) or below the private equity targets (see Table IV.19.).  
With regard to the announcement returns, my findings are in line with other studies. Gogineni (2011) 
mentions mean abnormal returns of 21.4%58 if a company is acquired by a private firm. In the study of Becht 
et al. (2014) with focus on the global regions North America, Europe and Asia, they find abnormal returns 
                                                          
58 Three-day event window [-1,+1]. 
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of between 4.0% and 6.9%59 in the course of the announcement of block purchases by activists. Other studies 
confirm the value creating effect of the engagement of activist investors (see for example Clifford (2008), 
Klein and Zur (2009), Stadler (2010), Mietzner et al. (2011) or Drerup (2011)).60 My findings concerning 
the market reactions and the comparison with other studies confirm the statements made by Caprio et al. 
(2011) that acquisitions by large shareholders result in positive announcement effects. And the U.S. focused 
study of Basu et al. (2009) concretises the positive correlation between the dominance of family ownership 
and positive abnormal acquisitions returns.  
IV.5. Conclusion 
This is to my knowledge the first study which compares the investment activities of Continental European 
family business investors with private equity investments and puts this topic thematically into the context 
of shareholder activism. My main objective of this study is to test the hypothesis that both investor groups 
do not significantly differ from their investment approach and strategy. Overall, the results of this study 
confirm this hypothesis as most of the differences between both investor groups are not statistically 
significant. Minor differences are mainly associated with their specific business model.  
The results of Table IV.16. indicate that family firms are more likely to target smaller companies 
with a higher dividend payout ratio, a slightly higher leverage (Short- and Long-term Borrowings to Assets), 
a cheaper valuation by the market (Market to Book Value) and a lower freefloat level. The analysis of the 
shortened sample period (Table IV.17.) is similar to this outcome. With focus on the business approach of 
both investors, it makes sense that family investors target companies with higher dividend payout ratios as 
their investment return highly depends on the dividend distribution of their investments. Furthermore, the 
business model of private equity firms is mainly based on financial engineering triggered especially by 
medium-term levered and unlevered measures (Achleitner et al., 2010). The focus of family investors on 
firms with low market to book values argues for a more conservative acquisition approach as these targets 
are favorably valued by the capital market and potentially less profitable compared to private equity targets. 
Beside the differences of the leverage between family business and private equity targets, the predictions of 
the logistic regression (see Table IV.18.) could not be verified by the outcome of Table IV.19. Reasons can 
be the limited sample size of the years 2010 to 2012 as well as the accumulation of specific target industries 
in the three-year period.  
The analysis of the market reactions in the course of the respective transaction announcements 
shows higher abnormal returns for family based acquisitions than for acquisitions with participation of 
private equity firms. Supported by the interpretation of the multiple regression (see Table IV.21.), these 
                                                          
59 Across two event windows [-10,+10] and [-20;+20]. 
60 Overview of stated abnormal returns: Clifford (2008) 3.39% surrounding the filing date [-2,+2], Klein and Zur (2009) 
10.2% in a 61-day event window, Stadler (2010) 3.27% [-2,+2], Mietzner et al. (2011) 8% if activist is a private equity 
firms compared to 5.41% if the acquirer is a hedge fund [-20,+20], and Drerup (2011) 1.27% [t=0]. 
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statistically significant results argue for the market participants’ confidence that family business investors 
are probably better qualified to efficiently integrate, manage and control the acquired companies. It could 
be summarised that family business investors in Continental Europe behave in a similar way like private 
equity investors and should therefore be involved as additional investor group in future studies on 
shareholder activism in Continental Europe. 
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V. Summary of Key Research Findings 
 
1. Independent from the prevailing corporate environment and corporate governance system, 
shareholder activism could be successfully executed in Continental Europe just like in Anglo-Saxon 
jurisdictions. The corresponding value enhancing effect of shareholder activism confirms the findings 
of most of the studies.  
2. In comparison with existing research, one key differentiating element and new insight of this study is 
the focus of the activist engagement on improving the profitability of the target companies. Due to 
the limited sample size, further research should verify this observation and its potential distinguishing 
feature of Continental European shareholder activism. 
3. Family business investors in Continental Europe should become part of the future research on 
shareholder activism which is another important finding of this dissertation. Beside some minor 
business model specific differences between family business investors and activist hedge funds and 
private equity funds, like for example their focus on smaller companies with higher dividend payout 
ratio, no major differences between the activist investor groups could be found.  
4. Measured by short- and long-term event studies, activist engagements by family business investors 
show higher abnormal returns compared to activist hedge funds and private equity funds. These 
findings suggest that family business investors are considered more suited by capital market 
participants to successfully impact the target companies than other activist investors.   
5. To further verify the findings of this dissertation a larger sample study incorporating all three 
mentioned activist investor groups, i.e. family business investors, hedge funds and private equity 
funds, could be conducted. 
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